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ABSTRACT 
 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review has emphasized the 
role of humanitarian assistance missions in winning the 
Global War on Terror. U.S. Pacific Fleet operates in an 
area prone to both terrorist recruitment and sudden-onset 
natural disasters that require humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief operations.  The U.S. Navy has unique 
capabilities to deliver first-response humanitarian 
assistance.  This thesis develops and suggests pre-
positions for humanitarian assistance pack-up kits that 
contain emergency relief material commonly used in these 
missions in order to expedite delivery to those impacted by 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 The U.S. military has historically been called upon to 
perform humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
missions.  These operations continue to gain attention and 
importance in the War on Terror.  The U.S. Armed Forces 
provide an instantly recognizable demonstration of the 
goodwill of the American people.  This representation makes 
a difference in changing the perception of the United 
States and helping to prevent terrorist recruitment.  
 U.S. Pacific Command’s area of operation is home to 
nearly sixty percent of the world’s population and 
experiences fifty percent of total world disasters.  The 
region covers over 105 million square miles and the tyranny 
of distance creates a logistics challenge even for routine 
operations.  Time-critical operations, such as in the acute 
phase of response to a disaster, make it even more crucial 
to have an understanding of the logistics requirements 
before the need arises.  
 The United States Navy has unique capabilities to 
provide immediate aid to reduce suffering after a disaster 
while other relief agencies and nations organize and 
prepare to enter the region.  The effectiveness of these 
capabilities diminishes as time passes, taking a toll on 
lives and human suffering.  A pre-positioned pack-up kit of 
first-response material can be immediately deployed, takes 
the guesswork out of initial requirements and helps 
capitalize on the Navy’s unique ability to arrive on scene 
quickly. 
 This thesis identifies the relief material necessary 
to meet the immediate requirements of a population 
 xviii
regardless of the type and location of the disaster.  
Logistics planning factors for each item are developed 
based upon the minimum standards in disaster response 
established by the Sphere Project, a humanitarian charter 
between hundreds of Non-Government Organizations and the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent, created to improve the quality 
of assistance provided to people affected by disasters.  
The 2004 Project Sphere Handbook outlines the minimum 
standards in disaster assistance promulgated by this 
collaboration.  These standards are used because they more 
accurately represent the needs of a civilian population 
suffering after a natural disaster than traditional 
military planning factors.   
Once the necessary items and appropriate planning 
factors are identified, we construct two versions of the 
pack-up kit: hot and cold weather-specific.  Each kit 
contains climate-appropriate material to support 1,000 
people for 14 days.   
 We introduce an optimization model to prescribe pre-
positioning pack-up kits in various candidate locations 
given budget and space limitations. The model is formulated 
to minimize “victim-nautical-miles” to transport the 
material to each potential disaster location.  It also 
determines the number of each version of the pack-up kit to 
procure and the optimal location(s) for them for a given 
budget.   
 We conclude that Singapore is the single best storage 
location for disaster relief pack-up kits. In addition, 
Osan, Republic of Korea, is the best location to store 
cold-weather pack-up kits.  Guam and Yokota, Japan, can 
also be used, but the impact is increased response time.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
 
 The U.S. military has historically provided assistance 
to victims of natural disasters.  This role will grow and 
gain importance as we try to win the “hearts and minds” of 
the world in our campaign against terrorism.  The 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes the importance of 
humanitarian assistance (HA) and disaster relief (DR) 
operations in today’s world: 
 
By alleviating suffering and dealing with crises 
in their early stages, U.S. forces help prevent 
disorder from spiraling into wider conflict or 
crisis.  They also demonstrate the goodwill and 
compassion of the United States. [DoD QDR 2006, 
p. 12] 
 
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) operates in an area 
that covers 105 million square miles.  This region is home 
to 60% of the world's population and 20% of its land area 
[USPACOM, 2006]. In addition, the United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2006) states 
that over 50% of total world disasters occur in the Asia 
Pacific region. Disasters here tend to have devastating 
consequences because regional populations are extremely 
vulnerable due to a variety of socio-economic factors.   
U.S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT) is regularly called upon 
to conduct humanitarian assistance operations in Southeast 
Asia.  These missions are complicated by the wide range of 
disasters afflicting the region.  Asia and the Pacific 
Islands are prone to typhoons, tsunamis, floods, 
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earthquakes, volcanic eruption and other natural hazards 
[UN ISDR, 2006].  These events are unpredictable and 
require a unique and timely response to save lives.  
 
B. THESIS MOTIVATION 
 
Lessons learned submissions from prior HA missions 
often cite that requirements are not known and that 
standardization of HA items would be beneficial.  The 
International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red 
Crescent (ICRC) has created kits of HA material for 
immediate response situations.  According to their website: 
 
Large-scale operations in various contexts 
worldwide are not always compatible with 
individual tailored response due to the urgency 
of the requests and needs. This is particularly 
true in emergency situations. Indeed, in the 
immediate emergency it might be impossible to 
determine and analyse demand: no records, no time 
for an in depth assessment. Although these 
situations where reactivity is of great 
importance differ, certain needs that frequently 
arise can be identified. The kit policy intention 
is to fulfil these needs in these situations by 
providing pre-packed, immediately available sets 
of material whilst guaranteeing the best possible 
use of human and economic resources. [ICRC, 2004, 
Vol. 3] 
  
Standardization of relief material can improve the 
Navy's ability to provide the rapid emergency response 
critical to sustaining life after a disaster.  This allows 
U.S. Forces to capitalize on their ability to conduct 
operations in austere locations where delivery and offload 
facilities are damaged or inadequate [JCS, 2001, p. IV-6].   
3 
 The U.S. Navy has unique capabilities beneficial to 
conducting first-responder humanitarian missions. Naval 
forces arrive with critical mass quickly, commence relief 
support immediately upon arrival and can sustain those 
operations indefinitely. The Navy does not rely upon shore 
infrastructure and can conduct command and control 
functions solely from the sea.  Minimizing presence ashore 
decreases force protection concerns and avoids a large 
build up of U.S. forces and material ashore. Naval forces 
are also flexible and can adapt quickly to a change in 
force protection level or change in the environment [CNO, 
2006, p. A-3].  
 Quick response is key. As time passes, the cost is 
lives lost. Since logistic requirements are not always 
clearly defined, units deploying to support the mission 
assemble their “best guess” of the supplies they require to 
hasten their arrival to the mission area. This approach 
allows personnel to arrive in the area quickly but results 
in disorganization and a large amount of unnecessary 
material in the region. 
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Doctrine for Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Joint Pub 3-07 [1995] 
states that materials required in humanitarian assistance 
operations are often used in quantities disproportionate to 
their standard military use.  This does not mean the answer 
is to procure large amounts of materials perceived to be 
beneficial. This is counterproductive as it creates a large 
footprint of materials that may or may not be used in the 
operation. Benefits that the Navy provides are diminished 
when inadequate or improper disaster relief materials are 
procured.  A standard HA pack-up kit (PUK) that can be put 
in use while additional requirements are determined will 
4 
allow the Navy to respond quickly with essential life-
sustaining supplies.  This kit can then be pre-positioned 
in a way that minimizes the time required to transport it 
where it is needed. 
 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
 
Disasters are unpredictable, but we know they will 
happen.  Knowing that we will be called upon to perform HA 
missions at some future time, it is important that we 
examine our logistics and identify materials essential to 
all such missions. Creating an HA PUK that contains a 
baseline of appropriate response materials to meet the 
minimum life-sustaining requirements of a population 
suffering after any type of disaster would expedite the 
arrival of these essential items into the disaster area.  
Supplemental items can be brought to the area once the 
unique requirements of the disaster have been assessed. 
Pre-positioning these PUKs will allow faster access to 
the materials.  Having a PUK pre-assembled and ready to 
ship takes the guesswork out of determining mission 
requirements.  Additionally, the PUK can be used to plan a 
Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) submission to 
U.S. Transportation Command’s (USTRANSCOM) for approval. 
This action estimates allocation of appropriate assets for 
movement.   
 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II provides an historic perspective of the 
5 
deployment of naval forces for HA/DR missions in Southeast 
Asia.  Additionally, Chapter II discusses the vulnerability 
of the region to disasters and the types of military 
foreign humanitarian assistance missions.  Chapter III 
presents the assumptions, logistic planning factors, 
positioning model formulation and analysis. Finally, 
Chapter IV contains concluding remarks and recommendations 
for future study in naval humanitarian assistance 
operations.  Appendix A lists the countries under USPACOM’s 
cognizance.  Appendix B provides birth rate data for 
determining the amount of infant supplies required for the 
PUK.  Appendix C contains the contents of the hot and cold-
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II. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 
ASIA PACIFIC REGION  
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
The history of humanitarian assistance operations 
conducted in Asia, the Pacific Islands and surrounding 
areas in recent years demonstrates the vulnerability of the 
region to disasters.  Reviewing recent operations provides 
insight into the types of humanitarian operations the Navy 
has participated in and supports an analysis of the 
similarities and differences of each disaster.   
To develop an effective PUK, it is necessary to look 
at operations covering the full range of disasters in the 
region. These past operations show the level of destruction 
inflicted and how the Navy has provided aid to the people. 
 
1. Operation Unified Assistance, 2004 
 
On December 26th 2004, an undersea earthquake with a 
magnitude of 9.0 unleashed a deadly tsunami, which killed 
over 275,000 people and left another 1.1 million people in 
Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and India without homes 
[Dorsett, 2005, p.12].   
Human activities are thought to have contributed to 
the devastation inflicted by the tsunami.  Many coral reefs 
in the Indian Ocean have been destroyed because they are 
considered a hindrance to economic progress.  Similarly, 
the removal of mangrove trees and sand dunes in many areas 
8 
has left the land vulnerable to the full impact of the 
tsunami. [Wikipedia, 2006]   
 
Figure 1: Undersea Earthquake Causing the 2005 Tsunami 




The U.S. Navy provided most of its assistance during 
the first six weeks after the tsunami.  Two days after the 
initial devastation, Joint Task Force 536, which later 
became Combined Support Force (CSF 536), was established to 
“provide assistance to the governments of Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, and other nations to mitigate the effects 
of the recent earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean” 
[Emerald Express 06-01, 2006, p.4].  Naval contributions to 
Operation Unified Assistance listed in Emerald Express 06-




• U.S. Navy ships from the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier 
Strike Group and USS Bon Homme Richard Expeditionary 
Strike Group, which delivered a combined total of 
over 24.5 million pounds of supplies; 
• Six ships from the Maritime Preposition Squadron 
(MPSRON) 3 in Guam deployed to produce and deliver 
potable water; and 
• USNS Mercy conducted Humanitarian Assistance 
Operations until mid-March. 
 
 The U.S. military provided relief of immediate 
suffering, lent support to the host nation and U.S. AID and 
allowed civil relief organizations time to organize their 
long-term response efforts [Emerald Express 06-01, 2006, 
p.5].  
 
2. Operation Lifeline, 2005 
 
On October 8, 2005, a major earthquake measuring 7.6 
on the moment magnitude scale hit the Kashmir region of 
Pakistan [World Almanac and Book of Facts, 2005].  While 
Pakistan is not located in U.S. Pacific Command’s 
(USPACOM’s) area of responsibility, the earthquake could 
just have easily occurred in India or other surrounding 
regions within USPACOM’s reach.  The earthquake killed over 
73,000 people and left 3.5 million people homeless [UN 
OCHA, 2006].  A contributing factor to the level of damage 
inflicted was that buildings in the region had poor 







Figure 2: Pakistan Earthquake 2005 [From RDML LeFevre 
Brief, 2006].  
 
 
 The American military led the international relief 
effort. The first Americans were in country surveying the 
area within 48 hours of the event and the first U.S. 
helicopters were airlifting supplies within 72 hours 
[Garamone, 2006].   
 
 
3. Philippines Mudslide, 2006 
 
 Two weeks of heavy rain caused a mountain side to 
suddenly collapse in Leyte, Philippines, on February 17, 
2006.  The collapse was blamed on past logging and mining 





Figure 3: Source and Aerial Extent of the Mudslide [From 
Huggler, 2006]. The area at the foot of the mountains was once the 
village of Guinsaugon, which is now unrecognizable under a blanket of 
mud.  Excessive rains caused a massive mudslide that engulfed the 
entire village. Over 30 feet of mud completely covered the 1.2 square 
mile area, trapping over 1,000 people [Huggler, 2006]. 
 
 
 The Forward-Deployed Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 
with elements of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit and 
Joint Task Force Balikatan had just arrived in the area for 
the bilateral exercise Balikatan 06.  The forces were 
redirected to the relief effort in Leyte [Sisk, 2006].  
Because the ESG was already in the area, they were able to 
begin relief efforts within 48 hours of the disaster. 
Numerous relief supply delivery sorties were conducted by 
the embarked Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM-262).  
Additionally, about 200 marines immediately joined in the 
search and rescue effort using shovels because the mud was 
too soft to support heavy machinery [Sisk, 2006]. 
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B. DISASTER CLASSIFICATION 
 
According to the United Nations International Strategy 
for Disaster Reduction [2006], a disaster is defined to be 
an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great 
damage, destruction and human suffering that overwhelms 
local capacity, necessitating a request to the national or 
international level for external assistance. Disasters can 
be separated into two major categories: “acts of God” (or 
natural disasters) and “acts of man” (also known as 
technological disasters).   
Natural disasters can be further split into three 
groups [UN ISDR, 2006]:   
• Hydro-meteorological disasters: floods and wave 
surges, storms, droughts and related disasters 
(extreme temperatures and forest/scrub fires), 
landslides and avalanches;  
• Geophysical disasters: earthquakes, tsunamis and 
volcanic eruptions; and 
• Biological disasters: epidemics and insect 
infestations.  
 A manmade, or technological disaster, is an event that 
brings on a major crisis, causes massive loss of life and 
property and may endanger the environment in which it 
occurs. Technological disasters include industrial 
accidents (chemical spills, gas leaks, and radiation), 
transport accidents and other miscellaneous accidents such 
as explosions and fires that are not caused by nature.  An 
example of a technological disaster is the 1986 Chernobyl 
nuclear reactor explosion [Evan & Manion, 2002].  
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1. Disasters in the Asia and Pacific Islands Region 
 
 Asia and the Pacific Islands suffer more natural 
disasters than any other area of the world [UNEP, 2001].  
Most major natural disasters occur due to climactic and 
seismic factors.  The majority of the region is located on 
the Ring of Fire, a zone of frequent earthquakes and 
volcanic eruptions that encircles the basin of the Pacific 
Ocean [Kious & Tilling, 1996, p. 39].  The Ring of Fire is 
a horseshoe-shaped region approximately 40,000 km long 
associated with a nearly continuous series of oceanic 
trenches, island arcs, and volcanic mountain ranges and/or 
plate movements. Eighty-one percent of the world's largest 
earthquakes occur along the Ring of Fire [U.S. Geological 
Survey, 2006].  The Asia-Pacific region has recorded over 
70% of the world’s earthquakes that measure 7 or more on 
the Richter scale and experiences an average of 15 events 
each year [UNEP, 2001].  Another hazard associated with the 
Ring of Fire is elevated levels of volcanic activity.  
In addition to geologic hazards, the Asia Pacific 
region has a broad range of climate and geographic 
features, making the region susceptible to a wider range of 
meteorological disasters [Preston, et al., 2006, p. 13].  
Nations north of 30˚N latitude (such as China and the 
Himalaya Mountains) can experience temperatures at or below 
freezing and have significant seasonal temperature changes 
[Preston, et al., 2006, p. 12].  Regions to the south 
experience temperatures above 25˚C year-round.  A view of 
average seasonal temperatures over a 30-year period is 
shown in Figure 4.  
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 Figure 4: Average Seasonal Temperatures across the Asia 
Pacific Region (1961 – 1990) [From Preston, et al., 2006]. 
This figure depicts the extreme temperature variations in the Asia 
Pacific Region.  For example, in January, temperatures throughout the 
region range from -20°C to +30°C.  U.S. Pacific Command must be prepared 
to conduct humanitarian assistance operations in a variety of climates. 
 
 
 Each geographic region has different characteristics 
that contribute to the type of natural disasters that occur 
in the area. Additionally, various seasons and the 
associated climate changes (temperatures) impact the 
affected population’s requirements after a disaster. 
Asia and Pacific Islands are regularly subjected to 
meteorological catastrophes.  The vast Pacific Ocean is a 
natural catalyst for powerful cyclonic systems.  Every few 
years, a phenomenon known as El Niño amplifies these 
15 
climatic events through the influence of unusually warm 
ocean temperatures [Shwartz, 2001]. 
 Meteorological catastrophes impact the region in 
several ways.  Flooding is the most common climate-related 
disaster in the region.  Floods occur for various reasons 
including seasonal flooding, flash floods, urban flooding 
due to inadequate drainage and typhoon-induced flooding 
[UNEP, 2001]. Aside from flooding, storms also cause 
devastation with their high winds and tidal surges. 
In addition to being more likely to experience a 
disaster, nations in this region are particularly 
vulnerable to these disasters. Figure 5 lists some of the 
factors the United Nations has identified that contribute 
to the progression of disaster vulnerability. Population 
growth, widespread poverty, environmental degradation, 
increasing pollution and unplanned human settlements 
increase the vulnerability of an area to disaster.  These 
factors create a favorable terrain for natural hazards to 
transform into devastating disasters that result in large 
death tolls and disrupted human lives and economic means 
[UN ISDR, 2006]. 
Marine resources, such as fishing and tourism, are 
very important parts of the regional population’s 
livelihood.  Environmental degradation of the region is 
pronounced, and it has stripped away many of the natural 
defenses against disasters such as typhoons and flooding.  
This was demonstrated by the level of destruction inflicted 
by the 2004 tsunami.  Coral reefs have been removed to 
clear shipping lanes and cater to tourists while mangrove 
trees have been uprooted to build homes and hotels, 
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effectively removing barriers that would have slowed the 
rush of water.  
 
  
Figure 5: Indicators of Disaster Vulnerability [From 
Interagency Secretariat of the International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction Asia and Pacific, 2004, p. 71]. This chart 
depicts factors that contribute to increased devastation after a 
disaster.  A quick review of the factors reveals that many countries in 
Pacific Command’s area of responsibility exhibit most, if not all, of 
these factors.  The United Nations Environment Program (2001) has 
stated that the Asia and Pacific region’s vulnerability to disasters 
has increased in recent years due to the aggregation of people in urban 
areas, environmental degradation, and a lack of disaster planning and 
preparedness. In addition, two out of every three people living in 
extreme poverty live in the Asia and Pacific Region [United Nations 
Population Fund, 2006]. 
 
 
   Poverty also impacts a nation’s ability to survive 
and recover from a natural disaster. For example, low-
income countries experience approximately 3,000 deaths 
after an earthquake compared with less than 400 deaths in 
middle and high-income countries [UNEP, 2006]. This is 
because low-income countries do not have the resources to 
build critical infrastructure to withstand earthquakes and 
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people live in crude structures that topple easily.  The 
2005 earthquake in Pakistan is an example of how poverty 
can exacerbate a disaster.   
 Rapid population growth in the region is also 
associated with increased vulnerability to natural 
disasters.  As populations rise, they spread into regions 
prone to disasters [UNEP, 2006].  Population growth also 
impacts the environment as areas are often degraded to 
build homes and promote economic development.   
It is not a question of “if” Pacific Command will have 
to provide emergency disaster relief, but rather “when” and 
“where.”  The region experiences most of the United Nations 
vulnerability factors because they are interrelated.  One 
factor is often the cause of another.  PACOM’s area of 
operations is not only highly likely to experience a 
natural disaster but the population is also extremely 
vulnerable to its impact.  Determining and pre-positioning 
the most critical materials can make it easier to plan and 
rapidly execute emergency relief operations. 
2. Types of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Missions  
 
 Military Foreign Humanitarian Assistance missions are 
classified as MOOTW.  Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint 
Publication 3-07.6 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance [2001] lists 





• Relief missions: immediate response to prevent loss of 
life and destruction of property, construction of 
basic sanitation facilities and shelters and provision 
of food and medical care. 
• Dislocated civilians support:  Humanitarian missions 
designed to support the resettlement of refugees, 
stateless persons, evacuees, expellees, and displaced 
persons.  These operations are generally long-term and 
outside the scope of Department of Defense (DoD) 
sources. Tasks include camp organization, basic 
construction and administration, provision of care and 
placement of civilians. Noncombatant Evacuation 
Operations, which are short-term in nature and within 
the scope of DoD activities, also fall under this 
category.  
• Security: Missions that establish and maintain 
conditions for the provision of FHA by organizations 
of the world-relief community.  U.S. military forces 
may be called upon to perform this mission in the 
event that the host nation is unable to provide for 
the security of the aid workers and supplies.  
• Technical assistance and support: Short-term tasks 
that include the restoration of communications 
systems, relief supply management, provision of 
emergency medical care, humanitarian de-mining and 
high priority relief supply delivery.  A military 
example of a technical service is the use of Naval 
vessels to transport displaced civilians.  
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• Consequence management operations: Operations that 
mitigate the effects of man-made disasters such as the 
intentional or unintentional release of weapons of 
mass destruction, chemical, biological or radiological 
materials, or explosions. 
 
The PUKs developed in this thesis are designed to 
support FHA relief missions.   
 
 3. COMPLICATING FACTORS TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
MISSIONS  
 
It is unfortunate, though often not realized, 
that people seldom estimate random events 
correctly; they always tend to remember the 
“exciting one” and forget the others, and as a 
result their opinions are nearly always 
unconsciously biased … Military personnel (and 
indeed most people without rigorous scientific 
training) tend to take opposite opinion of the 
relative validity of opinion versus facts … If 
science has learned one thing in the past three 
centuries, it is that such a point of view must 
be avoided if valid scientific results are to be 
achieved [Morse & Kimball, 1946, p. 5]. 
 
 
Advance planning for humanitarian missions is an 
arduous task due to the unpredictable occurrence of 
disasters. This unpredictability creates unique 
requirements for every disaster. There are certainly some 
items that can become part of a generic list based on the 
type of disaster, but caution must be used in its 
development. The same factors that make this region 
vulnerable to natural disasters also impact humanitarian 
assistance operations.  Geographic location, climate, 
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demographics, infrastructure, economic, cultural, 
political, and health factors are different for each 
disaster and must be considered before beginning operations 




























The HA PUK is designed to support disaster relief 
missions being conducted to provide critical, immediate, 
first-response, life-sustaining items to a region.  The 
next three subsections outline the assumptions used in 
creating the HA PUK. 
 
1. Naval Humanitarian Assistance Operations Are 
Conducted in a Permissive Environment   
 
According to the Chief of Naval Operations Naval 
Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-07, Naval Doctrine for MOOTW 
[1998], a permissive environment suffers little or no 
opposition or resistance to the relief operations.  A 
permissive environment generally exists for pure relief 
efforts after a natural disaster where the host nation’s 
control of the nation is not threatened.  Characteristics 
of a permissive environment include minimal security 
requirements, clear objectives, host nation cooperation, 
participation of Non-government Organizations (NGOs) and 
commonality of purpose for all parties [CNO NWP 3-07, 1998, 
p. 3-42]. 
Relief operations in which naval forces operate in 
uncertain or hostile environments will have additional 
force protection and rules of engagement considerations.  






2. Naval Forces Provide Relief in Response to a 
Sudden-Onset Natural or Man-Made Disaster 
 
  These PUKs will provide a ready source of relief 
materials tailored to meet the immediate requirements of 
disasters.  The mission is short-term in scope and will end 
when relieved by other NGOs and agencies. 
Slow-onset disasters, such as drought, are more likely 
to have a long-term impact on a population’s nutritional 
status.  Relief efforts in these regions tend to be long-
term and organizations have ample time to plan the 
operation. NGOs have the expertise required to operate in 
these areas and any U.S. military presence would likely be 
for peacekeeping missions rather than humanitarian 
assistance, so they are not studied in this thesis.  
 
3. Medical Supplies in the PUKs will be Limited to 
Basic First-Aid Materials  
 
There is no benefit to bringing advanced medical 
supplies to an area if no trained medical personnel are on 
scene to use them.  Additionally, every disaster will have 
different requirements that are best assessed by medical 
professionals.  The PUKs are designed to support life-
saving medical efforts until qualified medical personnel 
can arrive on scene.  According to the Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Center Post-disaster Damage Assessment & Needs 
Analysis Report [2000, p.15], the most common priority 
medical supply needs after various type of natural 
disasters are not medications, but items such as bandages, 
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gauze, splints and other items found in most first-aid 
kits. 
The World Health Organization states that the greatest 
demand for health services occurs within the first 24 – 48 
hours after the disaster. Most injured people arrive at 
medical facilities during the first three to five days.  A 
second wave of referred patients may arrive a few days 
after this as humanitarian operations become organized.  
The majority of injuries are minor cuts and bruises, a 
lesser number of simple fractures and a minority with 
serious injuries [Thieren, 1999].  
Additionally, the Navy has the USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) 
and the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) that can be employed for 
humanitarian relief. These floating ambassadors provide aid 
on both a psychological and physical level.  The medical 
capabilities of other large-deck naval vessels (CVN, LHD, 
LHA) and the embarked medical staffs can also be called 
upon to provide medical assistance.  These professionals 
can better assess the needs of the population and obtain 
the right vaccines, medicines and equipment.  They are also 
qualified to administer these items and properly use the 
equipment.  
 
B. LOGISTIC PLANNING FACTORS 
 
 Planning for humanitarian assistance operations is 
very different from planning war requirements.  Military 
planning factors are geared towards meeting the needs of a 
healthy population of men aged 18 to 45.  The standard 
planning factor for military operations is measured using 
pounds per man. Using this measurement, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine the needs of the majority of 
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the population.  The needs of a population suffering after 
a disaster that includes pregnant and lactating women, the 
elderly, infants, and children is not accurately 
represented.   
 In an effort to establish minimum standards for 
disaster assistance, the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent in conjunction with over 400 humanitarian 
organizations in 80 countries world-wide have joined to 
form a humanitarian charter called the Sphere Project.  The 
primary goal of the Sphere Project is to identify minimum 
standards to be obtained in disaster assistance. The 
collaboration has produced a handbook that is designed for 
use in disaster response that is applicable in a range of 
situations where relief is required.  Further, it is 
designed to meet the needs of any population (including 
those of both developing and developed nations) with the 
emphasis on meeting the urgent survival needs of people 
affected by disaster.  The handbook is not meant to serve 
as an instruction manual, but instead to provide a set of 
indicators to be used to assess and meet the needs of the 
population in any situation.  
 It is evident that the minimum standards established 
by Project Sphere have been accepted and incorporated into 
the planning guides of major humanitarian assistance 
organizations, e.g., the U.S. Agency for International 
Development Bureau for Humanitarian Response Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance Field Operations Guide [1998].  
Therefore it makes sense to use these standards when 
planning humanitarian assistance operations to a diverse 
population.   
 Military planning factors for humanitarian operations 
are examined by Sullivan [1995]. The planning factors in 
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her thesis are developed using the traditional military 
planning factor of pounds per man.  The majority of the 
planning factors she develops are best for use in long-term 
military humanitarian assistance operations, but a few are 
applicable in determining PUK quantities.   
 In order to ensure the PUK is versatile enough to 
cover the needs of enumerated possible disasters, the kit 
may include items not required at every disaster.  To 
minimize this occurrence, the planner has a choice between 
a cold and hot weather version of the kit. In addition, 
there may be other disaster-specific requirements aside 
from those addressed by the PUK contents.   
This PUK does not include assets to transport, deliver 
and distribute the supplies. A comprehensive transportation 
and distribution plan should be developed to use in 
conjunction with this PUK.   
  
1. Water and Sanitation 
  
 People affected by disasters are more likely to become 
ill and die from diseases related to inadequate sanitation 
and water supplies than any other cause. Therefore, the 
main purposes of establishing an emergency water supply and 
sanitation system are to provide a minimum quantity of 
clean drinking water and to reduce the transmission of 
faeco-oral diseases.  Some of the key indicators of meeting 
the minimum standards for water supply that are relevant to 
designing the PUK specified by the Sphere Project, [2004], 
are: 
 
• Provide at least 15 liters of water per person 
per day (equivalent of 4 gallons); 
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• Each household has two water-collecting vessels 
of 10 – 20 liters, plus water storage vessels of 
20 liters (both of which have narrow necks and/or 
covers); 
• Water must be palatable; 
• Water supplies at times of risk or presence of 
diarrhea epidemic must be treated with a residual 
disinfectant to an acceptable standard: residual 
free chlorine at the tap is 0.2-0.5 mg per liter 
with turbidity (silt and dirt) below 5 NTU; 
• Provide 250g of soap per person per month; and 
• Provide communal laundry facilities (if 
necessary) with 1 washing basin per 100 people 
with private laundering areas available for women 
to wash their undergarments.  
 
The situation should be assessed to determine if 
adequate water is available in the region.  If not, it will 
be necessary to find a way to provide water.  There may be 
adequate water available that is not potable, and in this 
situation water treatment units will be required.     
The Navy has several potential ways to provide water 
to a population in the worst-case scenario where the 
population has no access to clean water.  If there is no 
water present in the region, ship-board capabilities could 
be used to produce and package water.  Another option would 
be to distribute bottled water.  Bottled water should be 
used only as a last resort.  Many relief organizations 
bring bottled water to the scene and there is a tendency to 
over-stock.  The real need is often distribution, which is 
better served by providing air lift and personnel assets. 
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 If water is present but needs to be decontaminated 
before drinking, a new water purification known as the 
Tactical Water Purification System (TWPS) is replacing the 
old Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU).  This 
unit is the result of a joint acquisition program with the 
U.S. Army serving as lead agency. This new water 
purification system produces up to 1,500 gallons per hour 
(gph) of water compared to 600 gph from the ROWPU.  This 
water treatment system can produce potable water from 
fresh, brackish, salt, nuclear, biological, and chemically 
contaminated water sources [Roeder, 2006]. The production 
rates are shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1.   Water Production Capability of the Tactical 
Water Purification System by Water Type [From 
Department of the Navy, 2004, p. 1].  
 
The maximum output of the Tactical Water Purification System (TWPS) is 
1500 gallons per hour (GPH).  This rate can be achieved when using 
surface water or ground water with Total Dissolved Solids (TDS) such as 
salts or metals within the levels specified in the table.  A production 
rate of 1200 GPH can be achieved using Ground water or Seawater within 
specified TDS.  Turbidity (or cloudiness) of water for purification can 
not exceed 150 Nephelometric Turbidity Units (NTU) regardless of the 
water source.  The TWPS can purify water from just above freezing to a 
maximum of 95°F, depending on the water source and composition.   
 
 
The TWPS is fully self-contained (except for fuel) to 
perform a 5-day mission. It includes a 6,000 gallon storage 
and distribution system and all the associated hoses and 
tubes. These as well as consumables, tools and crew level 
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repair parts are packed for mission deployment. The system 
can produce water within 2 hours of arrival. It is 
automated and only requires one person to maintain normal 
operation [Department of the Navy, 2004, p. 2]. 
The TWPS purification levels are superior to those set 
by the Sphere Project.  It has a cold weather conversion 
kit so it can operate in temperatures down to 25 degrees 
below zero.  It can operate in temperatures up to 125 
degrees with 100% humidity.  Additionally, it operates well 
even in high levels of turbidity.  Assuming the minimum 
production of the TWPS (950 gallons) and a dispersion of 20 
liters per person, one TWPS will easily produce the daily 
water needs for 1,000 people.  It could prove daunting to 
try to distribute the water with only one unit.  Two units 
would be preferable, but one would suffice.   
Regardless of whether water is produced on scene or on 
ship, it is necessary to package the water to distribute to 
the people.  To best meet the minimum standard water 
quantity per person, a collapsible 5-gallon container will 
be issued per person.  This equates to almost 19 liters of 
water per container, just over the Project Sphere minimum 
standard.        
The Sphere handbook further recounts that in most 
emergency situations, water-related disease is just as 
likely to be caused by insufficient water for personal and 
domestic hygiene as it is to contaminated water supplies.  
In order to prevent an outbreak of disease, the water 
supply must be protected.  This must be done in conjunction 
with proper disposal of human excrement. Project Sphere 
minimum standards require convenient access to a sufficient 
number of comfortable, safe and hygienic toilets.  Planning 
factors associated with meeting this goal are:  
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• Maximum of 20 people per toilet; 
• Separate facilities for men and women in public 
forums;  
• Easily accessible by all (including the elderly 
and children); and 
• Easily kept clean and free of mosquito and fly 
breeding. 
 
The military is very resourceful in building latrines 
and establishing field sanitation.  Exact instructions are 
available in the Army Unit Field Sanitation Team Field 
Manual 4-25.12 [HQ Department of the Army, 2002].  
Construction battalions can also be sent to the area and 
tasked with establishing a sanitation system. These units 
are self-supporting, flexible and have considerable civil 
engineering capabilities [CNO NWP 3-07, 1998, p. 3-39]. 
The Army has defined a new series for latrine support 
that meets a spectrum of operations [Federation of American 
Scientists, 2001]. Prior methods of latrine construction 
are now realized to be unacceptable in many situations.  
While construction battalions prepare to enter the region 
(or in a situation where they are unavailable due to 
operational tasking), there are new options that can be 
used to meet sanitation needs. These options include: 
 
• Modular Initial Deployment Latrine (MIDL), 
• Maturing Theater Latrine (MTL), and 




Figure 6: Modular Initial Deployment Latrine [From Army 
Logistician News, 1999]. The Modular Initial Deployment Latrine is 
compact, lightweight, easily transportable and quickly assembled.   
 
Modular Initial Deployment Latrines (MIDLs) are 
designed to accompany personnel into theater at the start 
of operations.  An MIDL consists of a privacy tent and a 
folding toilet that has a disposable bag that is to be 
removed after use and collected in a disposal unit 
established for this purpose.  A new bag is then put in 
place for the next person.  The unit can also be placed 
inside another shelter as required. It is portable, 
lightweight and easy to assemble. 
 
  





Maturing Theater Latrines are similar to individual 
chemical portable toilets used at sporting events.  They 
require waste removal capability or the waste must be 
burned.  They are bulky and require more effort to 
transport into an area. 
Follow-on Latrines (FOLs) are containerized basic 
structures and have been developed to move into a mature 
theater of operations.  Batch laundry and shower modules 
are also available in separate containers.  The modules 
have been developed in military International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) containers (8’ X 8’ X 20’).  
  
 
Figure 8: Follow on Latrine [From Army Logistician News, 
1999] 
 
The FOL has six stalls, is temperature controlled and 
easily serviceable. The military planning factor is one 
unit per 150 men.  Restricting this factor to one unit per 
120 people meets the Project Sphere minimum standard for 
toilets.  This equates to a minimum of nine units per 1,000 
people.  The units could then be assigned as “male” or 
“female” based on the population demographics. 
FOLs are relatively expensive and present a 
considerable burden to quickly move into the area. Since 
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these units were designed to move into a mature theater, it 
is unlikely that the infrastructure to support these units 
will be available.  The FOL should be considered for more 
mature humanitarian assistance operations.  While the up-
front cost is high, they can be disinfected and reused 
countless times. 
The MIDL is included in the PUK. Its compact size 
makes it easy to transport and the unit can be assembled 
and ready to use quickly.  It does not require specialized 
equipment to discard the waste. Using the Project Sphere 
minimum standard of one toilet to 20 people, 50 MIDLs 
should be sent per 1,000 people.  The elderly or very sick 
may need assistance from relatives or a same-gender aid to 
avoid falling. 
The shower system and batch laundry modules would also 
be beneficial for humanitarian use if sufficient water is 
available to provide these services.  The minimum standard 
of 15 liters per person per day accounts for water required 
for hygiene uses such as hand-washing garments and sponge 
baths.   
Personal hygiene products will be required regardless 
of the shower policy chosen. Although men and women have 
different product needs, one generic kit can be made that 
contains items required by both genders. Additionally, 
there will be items in the kit that should not be given to 
children, such as razors and deodorant. The kit should be 
distributed to adults only to allow them to examine the kit 
contents and remove inappropriate material. 
The amount of feminine sanitary products required is 
often underestimated in disasters [McAskie, 1999]. 
Including them in every kit will ensure adequate supplies 
are made available. Having a single personal hygiene kit 
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also assists those who must distribute the items by 
aggregating the items into one, easily-distributed package. 
The kit should include soap, toothpaste, a toothbrush, 
shampoo, disposable razor(s), sanitary napkins, a towel, 
washcloth(s), a comb, and laundry detergent.  Toilet paper 
is not included in the hygiene kit as each MIDL personal 
relief kit comes with a plastic bag, toilet paper and a 
moist toilette.  The MIDL comes with enough plastic bags to 
meet the needs of 20 people for 3 days under “normal” 
circumstances.  Additional bags will therefore be required. 
Proper disposal of solid waste is also important to 
maintain sanitary living conditions. Project Sphere 
recommends that one 100-liter refuse container be allocated 
for every 10 families.  To adequately cover personal 
requirements, a planning factor of one standard trash bag 
per person per day is used [Sullivan, 1995].  In addition, 
10 extra refuse containers will be provided to meet the 
Project Sphere minimum standard.  Depending upon the type 
of disaster, there may be need for additional trash bags 
for use in clean-up efforts.  Finally, one refuse container 
per latrine is needed for placement outside the latrine to 
ensure proper disposal of the human waste.  Additional 
solid waste disposal requirements can be determined later 
and procured as necessary. 
Additionally, there may be a need to manage the 
removal of dead bodies.  This is an important task that 
must be done with decorum and in a way that allows for the 
identification of the dead. In addition, care must be taken 
to provide protection of workers when handling the bodies.  





• Masks (not vital, but may put workers at ease); 
• Gowns; 
• Body Bags; 
• Identification tags;  
• Pens; and 
• Cameras (to photograph bodies that must be buried 
before identification can be made or to document 
the site where the body was found). 
 
Allowing friends and relatives the opportunity to 
identify loved ones is important for psychological and 
perhaps religious reasons. Bodies should be maintained for 
identification purposes whenever possible. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Joint Publication 4-06, Mortuary Affairs [2006a], 
should be consulted for specific procedures and burial 
rituals of various religious groups.  Care should also be 
taken in the choice of body bag color to ensure its 
compliance with local cultural practice. 
 
2. Food and Nutrition 
 
Naval forces should focus on establishing an emergency 
feeding program. Emergency feeding aims to satisfy the 
needs of victims to sustain life and maintain good health.  
There are three phases in emergency feeding reflecting the 
stages of the situation: early, intermediate and extended 
emergency periods. Nutritional objectives, priority 
nutrients, and the food sources differ according to the 
period of emergency [Florentino and Bumanglag, 2002].  Our 
primary goal is to provide food and water in adequate 
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amounts for temporary maintenance in the early and 
intermediate phases.   
Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs) should be used to 
fill any feeding requirements from the time the disaster 
occurs until the mission is complete.  The HDR was created 
for use in emergency situations to feed and sustain 
moderately malnourished people until other, more 
traditional feeding methods are restored.  Each ration 
provides 2,200 calories, costs around four dollars and has 
a shelf life of three years [Armed Forces Press Service, 
2001]. Each ration weighs approximately 30 ounces and can 
be air-dropped if necessary as it will flutter to the 
ground [Smith, 2004]. These meals are nutritious, can be 
eaten by virtually anyone regardless of culture or 
religion, and are cost effective [Armed Forces Press 
Service, 2001].  The meals are self-contained and require 
no special serving or cooking utensils, minimizing the 
Navy’s need to bring in more gear to cook and serve meals. 
While the Humanitarian Daily Ration covers the 
immediate nutritional needs of most adult men, women, and 
older children, infants and very young children’s needs are 
still unmet.  For planning purposes, a ration should still 
be “provided” for each infant and child.  This ration 
should be given to the mother to help meet the extra 
caloric needs of a lactating woman [World Health 
Organization, 2004]. 
Food distribution can have a negative impact on a 
regional economy, as people will often take the free food 
and stop purchasing from local suppliers.  It is important 
to communicate with the host nation to determine if rations 
are needed or desired.  Other types of food that may be 
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Immediately after a disaster occurs, the most 
important first step is to allow the refugees materials to 
build themselves shelter with the following minimum 
standards for floor space [Sphere Project, 2004]: 
 
• 3.5 m2 per person in hot climates (excluding cooking 
space which is assumed to be outdoors), or 
• 4.5 to 5.5 m2 per person in cold climates (including 
cooking space). Increased space requirements accounts 
for people spending more time in the shelter to 
protect against the cold environment. 
 
Local supplies and services should be used in the 
construction of shelter to the maximum extent possible.  
Only if adequate resources cannot be obtained should 
additional materials be brought into the area [United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2000].  Assuming 
the worst case scenario, the area would be completely 
leveled with no structure remaining in place.  For this 
reason, tents are included in the PUK.  Sullivan [1995] 
recommends the General Purpose (GP) Medium Tent which 
houses 12 people for hot climates and a ten-man arctic tent 
for cold climates.  This tent is currently the standard 
used by most U.S. military forces deploying to extremely 
cold regions [Candler and Freedman, 2001, p. 558].  
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GP, Medium w/liner 12 civilian 545 528 
10 military
Arctic 4 civilian 76 199 
  
Table 2.   Tent Data Relevant to Humanitarian Use [From 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field 
Manual 55-15, 1997, C-2] 
 
 
Comparing the two tents to the Sphere minimum space 
standards, the GP Medium Tent with liner provides 
approximately 4.05 m2 floor space for 12 people, which is 
superior to the 3.5 m2 of floor space per person required by 
Project Sphere standards.  The arctic tent, however, fails 
to meet the cold climate per person space requirement. When 
used to house 10 people, it provides only 1.84 m2 of floor 
space per person.  Adjusting the tent to house four people 
yields a floor space of 4.62 m2, which is consistent with 
the minimum standard.   
In addition to the cold weather tent, the U.S. Army 
Research, Development, and Engineering Center has developed 
the Family of Space Heaters.  The Space Heater, Arctic 
(SHA) has been designed to heat the Arctic Ten-Man Tent and 
other tents with 100 to 200 square feet of floor space.  It 
is 35 pounds and designed to be mobile and easy to assemble 
[Candler and Freedman, 2001, p. 558].  The stove is capable 
of using multiple fuels including diesel, JP8, JP5, 
kerosene, wood and coal.  This heater will accompany the 
10-Man Arctic Tent for humanitarian operations in cold 
climates.  
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The key element to adequate shelter is providing a 
roof [USAID OFDA, 1998, III-88]. One of the most versatile 
materials is UV-resistant heavy duty plastic sheeting.  
This can be used to temporarily repair windows, repair 
roofs in urban settings and reinforce tents and other 
emergency shelters [UNHCR, 2000]. Further, plastic sheeting 
is listed as one of the most common priority needs after 
disasters in Asia by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center 
[ADPC, 2000, Annex D].   
Other common shelter requirements on the ADPC priority 
needs list [2000] include beds and bedding and mosquito 
netting.  The Sphere Handbook [2004, p. 204] minimum 
standard for bedding states that “people have access to a 
combination of blankets, bedding or sleeping mats to 
provide thermal comfort and enable separate sleeping 
arrangements as required.”  The military can best meet this 




• Blanket (climate appropriate), 
• Set of Bed linens, 
• Pillow, and 
• Mosquito netting (in hot climates). 
 
Providing each person with a cot provides a barrier 
from the ground to protect against losing body heat.  An 
appropriate blanket is included in each version (hot and 
cold) of the PUK.  In hot or humid climates, mosquitoes can 
quickly spread disease.  Mosquito netting helps to protect 
the population.  Many countries will not allow mosquito 
39 
netting with insecticides.  Therefore, non-insecticidal 
netting is used in the hot-weather PUK. 
While these items may seem to be unnecessary for 
infants, in an emergency situation these items can be used 
to accommodate their needs until other relief groups arrive 
on scene with additional supplies.  Therefore, all these 
items will be provided for each infant as well as for each 
adult.  
An important dynamic of populations affected by 
disasters in Asia is that they do not tend to rely upon 
evacuation camps, but instead rely upon kinship ties and 
community networks.  They will seek refuge in one-another’s 
homes, watch over children and share food.  Camps in these 
areas are best used for information sharing and as 
distribution points rather than temporary shelter [ADPC, 
2000].  Even though families may not require temporary 
shelter, communities may become overwhelmed by the 
additional strain. 
Site planning and the establishment of evacuation 
camps are long-term solutions.  This PUK will not address 
these items as adequate time and planning will be necessary 
to determine the requirements.  Chief of Naval Operations 
Naval Warfare Publication 3-07 Military Operations Other 
than War [1998] addresses the material and personnel 
requirements of long-term missions. 
 
4. Communications  
 
Establishing communications quickly is vital to 
conducting an effective humanitarian assistance mission.  
Poor communications result in security risks, uncoordinated 
relief efforts, inability to relay critical information to 
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relief headquarters and make an already chaotic situation 
worse [ADPC, 2000].   
Even in an age with cell phones and e-mail, after a 
disaster cell towers and landlines are often heavily 
damaged or oversaturated. These items may even be 
unavailable in some nations.  Reliable alternatives must be 
made available for emergency workers.  These options should 
be compatible with civilian communication equipment and 
easy to use with minimal training by novices.  
Effective communication is built into military 
missions. In fact, it has been said that providing 
communications is one of the most important contributions 
the military can make to humanitarian assistance operations 
[Emerald Express 06-01, 2006, p.16]. Establishing a way to 
communicate with the Host Nation, Non-Government 
Organizations and other agencies ensures coordination and 
unity of effort.  Knowing the form of communication 
typically used by other agencies ensures our actions are 
visible to others. 
The Emerald Express 2006 review of military support in 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief highlights two 
important ways the military can help link to the other 
players involved: emphasizing web-based communications 
networks and relying primarily on unclassified information.  
For example, the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) provided 
an unclassified, unrestricted access communication network 
during tsunami relief efforts. By establishing rules for 
posting early, and keeping the information unclassified and 
available to all, international coordination and 
cooperation were greatly enhanced [Emerald Express 06-01, 
2006, p. 16].   
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The key to using an unclassified network effectively 
is allowing all participants unrestricted access to the 
website [Emerald Express 06-01, 2006, p.17].  Based on the 
Emerald Express findings, using the APAN communication 
network in future disasters in the region should be common 
procedure, with force protection information being the only 
element classified.  If operating in an area not covered by 
the APAN network, establishing an unrestricted access 
website for all agencies involved may prove to be a 
valuable contribution to the relief effort. 
Effective ground communication will vary depending 
upon the type and location of the disaster.  It makes sense 
to have personnel bring communication gear with them to the 
region rather than establish items in the PUKs that may or 
may not be useful.  This ensures compatibility with the 
host nation, that personnel know how to use the equipment 
and that the equipment is in good working order.   
 
5. Search and Rescue (SAR) 
   
To be effective, search and rescue missions must begin 
soon after a disaster occurs.  The need for search and 
rescue, life-saving first aid and other immediate medical 
response is short-lived.  According to the Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Center [2000], external search and rescue 
teams are commonly used for disasters associated with 
flooding, such as after a typhoon.   
External SAR teams are not usually necessary after an 
earthquake [ADPC, 2000, Annex D]. The majority of search 
and rescue after an earthquake is performed within the 
first 24 hours by the survivors.  Since most of the victims 
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rescued suffer from crushing injuries, experience shows 
that extrications after six hours have a low probability of 
survival [Demirkinan et al., 2003, p. 247-250]. 
If the Host Nation requests assistance in their search 
and rescue effort, the necessary personnel and supplies 
will need to arrive on location as soon as possible to be 
immediately employed.  The Navy and Marine Corps have 
personnel who are trained in conducting SAR missions.  
Rather than assemble SAR supplies in the PUK, units 
normally tasked with performing humanitarian assistance SAR 
missions should identify and maintain the necessary items 
with the unit and develop a concept of operations for 
humanitarian missions.  This will ensure that both the unit 
and the required gear can deploy at a moments notice. 
 
6. First Aid and Medical Supplies 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed an 
Interagency Emergency Health Kit (IEHK) 2006.  The IEHK is 
the third edition of this kit, designed for use in the 
early phase of an emergency. One kit is designed to support 
10,000 people for 3 months. The kit is designed for a 
displaced population without access to medical facilities 
[WHO, 2006b]. 
The kit consists of two modules: a basic supply module 
and a supplemental unit. The basic supply module is 
packaged in 10 boxes.  Each box is identical and can be 
separated to serve 1,000 people each. The basic kit 
contains items otherwise overlooked by military first aid 
kits, such as Folic acid (for pregnant and lactating women) 
and Gentian Violet (for treatment of thrush, yeast 
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associated with breastfeeding) in addition to first aid 
items. The items in this kit are designed to be distributed 
by people with little medical training and an instruction 
manual is provided. Optional anti-malaria items are 
included in the hot-weather version of the PUK. 
The supplemental unit contains 14 boxes and is 
packaged in a manner that allows it to be broken down so 
that unnecessary items do not need to be sent.  It contains 
items that are useful if trained medical professionals are 
available. It is also designed to benefit a diverse 
population, and it contains a midwifery kit and other 
requirements for pregnant and lactating women.  
Since the medical portion of the PUK is developed to 
support basic first aid medical needs, the basic unit can 
be broken up to support ten PUKs.  The planner can decide 
if medical personnel will be available and send the 
supplemental unit only when necessary.  The IEHK 2006 is 
included in the PUK.   
 
7. Clothing  
 
 According to the Sphere handbook [2004], the minimum 
standard for clothing is to provide all women, girls, men 
and boys with at least one full set of climate and 
culturally appropriate clothing. In addition, children 
under two-years old should be provided a blanket at least 
100cm X 70cm. Further, “at risk” individuals (the elderly, 
injured, sick) may need to have additional clothing 
provided to meet their needs. These standards are 
intentionally vague and can be interpreted in many ways.    
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 The worst-case scenario dictates that the entire 
population has an immediate need for clothing. Cultural, 
religious, and climatic differences mean that enumerated 
sizes, types, and weights of clothing would need to be 
available to meet any situation.  Clothing must also be 
gender-appropriate. This element alone can seriously impact 
the effectiveness of the entire relief effort. Loss of 
cultural adornments, clothes, head coverings and other 
forms of traditional dress during crises can, in some 
societies, affect a woman’s identity and restrict her 
ability to take part in relief programs and attend food 
distributions [McAskie, 1999]. For example, Muslin women 
often will not interact with males without a head-covering.  
 In order to meet Project Sphere minimum standards, it 
would be necessary to store enumerated types and sizes of 
clothing. Bringing unacceptable clothing to the region is a 
waste of time and space.  During Tsunami relief, used 
clothing was often rejected by the recipients who felt 
demeaned that they should be expected to wear previously 
worn clothing [Russell, 2005, p. 4].  This is neither cost 
nor space effective.  Clothing items should not be part of 
this PUK.  The response team should wait until requirements 
can be determined and procure the items locally.   
 There are many relief organizations that have cost-
effective, appropriate clothing in the proper sizes and 
styles. For example, the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) has a warm clothing kit for children that contains 
boots, padded jacket, scarf and hat, and mittens in four 
sizes that costs only twenty U.S. dollars per kit. The 
number of blankets in the cold-weather PUK will be 
increased to two and the heated shelters will need to be 
raised quickly instead of trying to accommodate all types 
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of appropriate clothing.  This will keep victims warm while 
the host nation or other agencies gather the appropriate 
clothing.   
   
8. Infants 
  
Mortality among infants and children is usually 
highest at the onset of an emergency when conditions are 
most threatening.  One of the first actions that should be 
taken by relief workers is identifying households with 
infants and young children, along with lactating and 
pregnant women [World Health Organization, 2004].  This 
action alone can alert the surrounding community to make 
scarce resources available.  
Infants have special requirements to address.  The 
ICRC has developed an infant kit for use in relief 
operations.  The kit contains items for one infant to last 
one month [ICRC, 2004]: 
• Blanket (70 X 95 cm), 
• 3 kg of laundry soap, 
• 100 g Bar of body soap, 
• 250 ml Baby shampoo, 
• 250 ml Baby lotion, 
• 250 g Baby powder, 
• 12 washable diapers (cloth), 
• 1 pair plastic pants (diaper cover), and 
• 1 thermometer. 
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The use of disposable diapers is a western concept. In 
most Asian Pacific regions, disposable diapers are 
considered a luxury.  Infants are often “trained” to 
eliminate in a specific spot upon cue from their mothers.  
But since the kit is designed to provide aid in a variety 
of scenarios, both disposable diapers and cloth diapers 
should be provided.  In addition, several wash cloths are 
provided for hygiene during diaper changes. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has published 
numerous documents regarding infant feeding in emergency 
situations.  Foremost among their advice is that artificial 
milk (also known as infant formula) be avoided whenever 
possible [Emergency Nutrition Network Online, 1999].  The 
Infant Feeding in Emergencies [1999] Report states: 
The resources needed for safe artificial feeding - 
such as water, fuel and adequate quantities of 
appropriate breast milk substitutes - are usually 
scarce in emergencies. Artificial feeding in these 
circumstances increases the risk of diarrhoeal 
diseases and malnutrition, which in turn 
substantially increase the risk of infant death.  
In an emergency, the adequate supply of 
appropriate food is obviously of fundamental 
importance. A common belief is that in emergencies 
it is infants who are at greatest risk of becoming 
malnourished - but this is not true of breastfed 
infants. The ability to breastfeed is robust, even 
in the face of constraints such as reduced 
maternal dietary intake and psychological stress. 
There may, however, be occasions where 
breastfeeding is not an option for some infants 
and alternatives are required [Emergency Nutrition 
Network Online, 1999, Introduction]. 
 
The first three recommended food sources for infants 
in the report are breastfeeding, use of a wet nurse 
(lactating woman) and the use of banked breast milk [ENNO, 
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1999]. Infant formula is often over-donated by well-meaning 
humanitarian organizations.  Flooding the hospitals and 
region with infant formula often negatively impacts the 
host nation’s breastfeeding programs.  
While breastfeeding is recommended, the need for 
infant formula cannot be ignored.  Infants who are orphaned 
or are born to HIV-positive mothers cannot be breastfed. 
The World Health Organization recommends that infant 
formulas, if determined necessary, be purchased locally and 
given in a controlled distribution and supervised area.   
In these instances, feeding cups and spoons (not bottles) 
should be used [Project Sphere, 2004].  Many women may be 
unfamiliar about how to properly use the formula which is 
further exacerbated by a language barrier in preparation 
instructions [USAID OFDA, 1998, p. III-45]. For these 
reasons, infant formula will not be included in the PUK.   
Infants between the age of six months and two years 
require complementary feeding.  Complementary feeding 
starts when breast milk alone is no longer sufficient to 
meet all the nutritional requirements of infants and 
supplemental foods and liquids must be added to their diet 
[Dewey, 2001].  These food items are given in conjunction 
with continued breastfeeding.  Consistency of the items 
offered range from semi-solid, pureed foods in the 
beginning and gradually progress to finger food and 
chewable solids as the child ages.   
Complementary foods are best accepted when they come 
from suitable local items familiar to the people and the 
children.  Other food items should be brought in only if no 
suitable local items are available [World Health 
Organization, 2004].  For this reason, no complementary 
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food items will be stored in the PUK.  These items are 
better assessed and contracted for (as needed) at the local 
level.  The Navy should consult with nutrition program 
experts such as the World Health Organization or the United 
Nations Children’s Fund if local foods are unavailable.   
We estimate the number of infant kits required in each 
PUK by looking at the region’s birthrate. The Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) maintains a World Factbook [2006] 
that gives the birthrate per 1,000 people ranked from 
highest to lowest. Birthrates in the PACOM region range 
from 17th to 212th. The average birthrate is 21.99 and is 
distributed about the mean as shown in Figure 9.   
The average accounts only for the number of infants 
from birth to one year old. Given a relatively stable 
birthrate, we can double this number and assume an average 
of 44 infants age two years and below per 1,000 population.  
The planner will need to manually adjust the number of 
infant kits in the PUK after a disaster occurs.  For 2006, 
the birth rates for nations that are assigned to PACOM 
along with the estimated number of infants younger than two 






















Figure 9: 2006 Number of Births per 1,000 Population for 
Nations in Pacific Command’s Area of Responsibility [After 




9. Electricity and Fuel Requirements 
 
In humanitarian operations, generators are primarily 
used for cooking, security lighting and water distribution 
[Sullivan, 1995, p.75].  Sullivan uses an allocation policy 
based on the use of 60KW generators: 
 
• Functional infrastructure: one for every 1800 people, 
• Damaged infrastructure:  one for every 900 people, or 
• No infrastructure:  one for every 450 people. 
 
The PUK relies upon Humanitarian Daily Rations to 
provide most of the nutrition requirements for the 
population.  This eliminates the need for a generator for 
cooking purposes. The water purification equipment 
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identified operates on fuel, but requires a 60KW generator 
as well.  Therefore, two generators will meet the 
electricity requirements of 1,000 people – one generator 
for the Tactical Water Purification System and one for 
everything else.  A field hospital brought into the area 
will arrive with the ability to generate power. 
Actual transportation equipment to be used in the 
region will vary depending upon the terrain and other 
region-specific factors. This PUK does not include these 
items, but assumes that the receiving unit will provide the 
necessary equipment to unload and transport the supplies 
once they arrive in the area. 
Fuel consumption rates for common equipment used in 
humanitarian assistance operations were calculated by 
Sullivan (1995).  Table 3 is a summary of the fuel 
requirements for items in the PUK with fuel requirements 
and those of transportation equipment commonly used.  
Sullivan used the “Yukon 1950” heater model in her thesis.  
This heater has since been replaced due to safety concerns.  
The Space Heater, Arctic, which is part of the new Family 
of Space Heaters (FOSH), is currently being integrated.  
Since no fuel consumption rate was available, we will 
assume it is comparable to the Yukon 1950 that it replaced.  
The fuel requirements for the Tactical Water Purification 


















TWPS 10000 3.5 Hour Diesel 
60KW 400HZ TQC Generator 4153 5 Hour Diesel 
6000 Lb. Rough Terrain Forklift 27100 5 Hour Diesel 
Rough Terrain Container Handler 105120 8.5 Hour Diesel 
5-Ton Truck1 22000 0.1243 Mile Diesel 
Space Heater, Arctic 50 0.63 Hour Diesel2
     
1 At least one 5-ton truck is required to transport the TWPS. 
2 SHA burns all types of fuel.  Diesel is selected to keep a uniform 
fuel type. 
 




Fuel will be made available through organic military 
assets or by contracting as required. These fuel usage 
rates can help the planner determine what the fuel 
requirements are likely to be, based on the equipment being 
used by the receiving unit.  
 
C. ADVANTAGES OF PRE-POSITIONING THE PUKS 
 
The PUKs are designed to provide immediate relief to 
disaster victims.  Kit benefits diminish as time 
progresses.  Finding locations to store the kit that 
minimize the distance to areas likely to require future 
assistance can save lives. 
The PUK takes much of the guesswork out of determining 
urgent needs, which saves planning time.  Since all the 
materials are ready to ship, there is no need wait for 
orders to be filled.  This means that transportation time 
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getting to the region is the fundamental constraint on 
delivering the aid where it is needed.   
There are some potential disadvantages to pre-
positioning material. The initial cost outlay of purchasing 
material to fill the PUK could be prohibitive. In addition, 
there are holding costs to store the material and potential 
obsolescence costs for shelf life, particularly with the 
medical supplies and Humanitarian Daily Rations.   
 Often the U.S. military’s true role in humanitarian 
assistance operations is to provide distribution capability 
and manpower for the host nation or NGOs on scene.  This is 
particularly true in cases where the U.S. Navy is asked 
later in disaster relief to provide assistance. In these 
circumstances most of the material requirements have been 
met by other agencies and minimal, known supplies are 
required to be provided by the Navy.   
 
D. POSSIBLE PRE-POSITIONING LOCATIONS 
  
Many potential storage locations could be identified 
within Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. This 
necessitates the development of candidate location 
criteria.  These criteria are: 
 
• Strategic geographic location in the region, 
• Good relationship with the United States, 
• Current agreements for base use in place, 
• Amount of established infrastructure, particularly 
for logistics, and 
• Other, location-specific considerations. 
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First, we identify locations with a strategic position 
in the region. The COMPACFLT Draft Standard Operating 
Procedure for HA/DR has been reviewed to learn what USPACOM 
considers to be its primary Aerial Ports of Departure 
(APODs). Several other APODs in the region and in 
continental United States are also identified. This 
provides an initial list of candidate locations to review 
for potential use as storage sites. 
The most important factors in selecting potential 
storage locations are the amount of available logistics 
infrastructure (particularly storage capacity) and the 
cargo handling capability at the Aerial Ports of 
Debarkation (APODs).  A general review of the Asia-Pacific 
area reveals that the United States has significant 
logistics capability in the region. Of particular 
significance for storage potential are Defense Logistics 
Agency Defense Distribution Depots and Fleet and Industrial 
Supply Centers (FISC). 
DLA has 26 Defense Distribution Depots worldwide, with 
several locations in the Asia and Pacific region.  These 
DLA Defense Distribution Depots offer a full range of 
distribution services to support the Armed Forces [DLA DDC, 
2006a].  One of these services offered is the creation of 
“customized kitting.”  The service description on the DLA 
DDC website states the DDC will “collaborate with customers 
to create kits of items designed for specific purposes.”  
There is a cost associated with this service, but the 
option exists.   
In addition to DLA DDCs, the Navy has seven Fleet and 
Industrial Supply Centers (FISCs) under the direction of 
Commander, Fleet and Industrial Supply Center. COMFISCUS is 
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responsible for global logistics issues and ensuring best 
practices are standardized throughout the FISCs.   
The FISCs provide “around the clock, worldwide 
logistics solutions for Navy, Marine Corps, Joint and 
Allied Forces in support of National Defense Strategies 
[FISC Yokosuka, 2006].”  Warehouse operations under 
COMFISCUS include kitting and storage for future use or 
shipment.  These functions can be exploited for storing the 
PUKs. 
In addition to storage space, the kits require 
transportation assets to deliver the material where it is 
needed. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) 
is the Department of Defense distribution owner.  Since 
September 2003, USTRANSCOM has sole control to direct and 
supervise execution of the strategic distribution system.  
USTRANSCOM accomplishes its mission using its three 
component commands: Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift 
Command and Military Surface Deployment and Distribution 
Command.   
USTRANSCOM’s vision [2006] is to “create and implement 
world-class global deployment and distribution solutions in 
support of the President, Secretary of Defense, and 
Combatant Commander-assigned missions.” As the entity 
overall responsible for strategic defense distribution, 
TRANSCOM plays a critical role in the formation of 
operational plans (OPLANs) in the Joint Operation Planning 
and Execution System (JOPES).  JOPES allows users "to 
monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, 
employment, and sustainment activities associated with 
joint operations [JCS JP 1-02, 2006b, p. 293].”  
Logistics plans are created in JOPES using the Time 
Phased Force and Deployment Data base (TPFFD).  This 
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database contains "time-phased force data, non-unit-related 
cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the 
operation plan [JCS JP 1-02, 2006b, p. 546].” USTRANSCOM 
analyzes strategic sea and air transportation to assist 
Combatant Commanders in ensuring all operational plans 
(OPLANS) are feasible.   
We assume that the PUKs are being transported in 
accordance with an established operational plan. Since 
speed of delivery is considered critical, air 
transportation is used as the primary means of 
transportation.  Therefore, APOD capacity is another 
limiting factor on the amount of material that can be 
stored at a particular location.   
For planning purposes, we must determine how much 
material each region can store and its associated APOD can 
transport. Locations with a DLA DDC or a FISC are 
considered to have an unrestricted ability to store and 
transport the PUKs.  The amount of potential storage space 
is evaluated using three categories for simplicity: small, 
medium and large. Each category is measured in the maximum 
“kit-equivalent” units that can be stored.  A “kit-
equivalent” unit represents the number of hot-weather PUKs 
that can be stored at a given storage location.  While the 
hot-weather and cold-weather PUKs have different 
footprints, the number of kits a storage location can store 
is based solely on the hot-weather PUK.  Small means the 
location has the ability to store the 5 kit-equivalent 
units, medium is 15, large can store as many of either type 
of kit as are made available.   
The APODs are evaluated using the same small, medium 
and large criteria. One C-5 has a maximum load of 
approximately 36 pallets or 70 short tons.  A small APOD 
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can load one C-5 per day, a medium APOD 1.5 C-5’s and a 
large APOD 2 C-5’s.  The planner will not have control as 
to the type of airframe provided; this measure is used 
simply because it corresponds to the approximate normal 
cargo handling capability at each APOD. AMC can authorize 
overtime or bring in additional cargo-handlers that can 
increase throughput if necessary, but this will not be 
considered.  
Table 4 depicts the capacity and transportation 







Locations (APOD): Available Capacity 
Singapore (Paya Lebar) Small Medium 
Japan (Yokota AFB) Large Large 
Guam (Andersen AFB) Large Medium 
Diego Garcia  Medium Medium 
Hawaii (Hickam AFB) Large Medium 
Osan, DPRK Medium Medium 
Sydney, Australia (Richmond RAFB) Small Small 
Norfolk, VA Large Large 
San Diego, CA (Travis AFB) Large Large 
 
Table 4.   Storage Capacity and Cargo Handling 
Capability for each Location. 
  
A storage location is considered to be small if it can hold five PUK-
equivalent units, medium can hold 15 and large can store as many kits 
of either type as made available. The Cargo Handling Capacity of an 
Aerial Port of Debarkation is judged by the number of C-5 aircraft that 
can be loaded in an eight-hour period. Small capacity indicates one 
aircraft, medium 1.5 aircraft and large two aircraft. The locations 
whose available storage space and cargo handling capacity do not match 
are rated at the lowest threshold and given a maximum number of PUK-
equivalent units in accordance with the storage capacity categories.  
 
 
Aside from the logistics and transportation factors, 
certain locations have more political appeal.  Pre-
positioning the PUKs in a U.S. owned or well-established 
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location provides the Navy with better control over storage 
and movement options.  
  Although one location may demonstrate clear 
superiority, there may be limits due to a lack of available 
storage space, transportation, or other factors.  This is 
accounted for by limiting the number of kits allowed to be 




The United States maintains a strong working 
relationship with the Government of Singapore. In 1990 the 
U.S. and Singapore signed an Access Memorandum of 
Understanding to provide the U.S. access to the Naval Base 
at Sembawang and Paya Lebar Air Base [Garcia, 2001]. The 
Paya Lebar Air Base is home of the Royal Singapore Air 
Force Air Logistics Squadron 122 which is comprised of C-
130 aircraft.  
The country’s strategic location in the region has 
made it a major hub of U.S. regional logistics.  Commander, 
Logistics Group Western Pacific (COMLOGWESTPAC), based in 
Singapore, is responsible for Naval logistics throughout 
the region.  In addition, the Naval Regional Contracting 
Center Singapore, and the Military Sealift Command Office 
are in close proximity and can easily be called upon when 
needed. Singapore can accommodate large vessels at Changi 
Naval Base [Garcia, 2001]. The logistical expertise and 
robust at-sea logistics capability made COMLOGWESTPAC the 
ideal choice to become the Navy logistics staging point 
during Operation Unified Assistance [Bell, 2005].  
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While Singapore allows the U.S. access to all its 
bases, the U.S. has no permanent established 
infrastructure.  This limits the amount of storage space 
for PUKs.  A potential delay could be caused by a lack of 
ground handling capability. During Operation Unified 
Assistance, Reservists from Cargo Handling Battalion One 
were called in to load aircraft and ships with relief 
supplies [Scherman, 2005]. Additionally, coordination with 
the Government of Singapore would be required before air 
lift operations could begin. 
Singapore’s strategic location could accommodate 
moving the material via ship if a disaster happens in close 
proximity to Singapore. This would give the advantage of 
being able to transport multiple PUKs simultaneously, as 
storage space on Military Sealift Command ships is far less 
limited than aircraft.   
The primary limitation on storing disaster relief 
material in Singapore is storage space.  For this reason, 
the number of kits that can potentially be stored in 
Singapore will be limited to five PUKs, regardless of type.  
Once the relief effort is underway and timeliness of 
response is less crucial, Singapore may serve as a 





The U.S. military has been operating out of Japan 
since the end of World War II and our nations maintain good 
relations. The Navy has established infrastructure in 
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multiple locations, including Fleet and Industrial Supply 
Center, Yokosuka, Military Sealift Command Far East, 
Yokohama, and numerous Naval Air Facilities.  These (and 
other) bases provide ample storage location choices as well 
as access to logistics personnel. Another benefit of 
placing the PUKs in Japan is that the material is stored 
close to multiple transportation sources.   
Yokosuka, Japan, has several potential storage 
locations for the PUKs.  Yokosuka Naval Base is the United 
States’ largest overseas Naval Base.  The Fleet and 
Industrial Supply Center, Yokosuka, is the U.S. Navy’s 
largest supply facility in the Western Pacific 
[GlobalSecurity.org, 2006b]. Additionally, Defense 
Logistics Agency has its largest overseas Defense 
Distribution Center in Yokosuka [DLA DDC, 2006d].  
Yokosuka’s primary APOD is Yokota AFB, which has a large 
cargo handling capability.  There are also three additional 
small APODs (Misawa, Iwakuni, and Fukuoka) in Japan.  These 
robust storage and transportation capabilities enable Japan 




Guam has been a territory of the United States since 
it was ceded in 1897 at the end of the Spanish-American 
War. Its status as a U.S. territory offers the U.S. Navy 
the advantage of a forward-deployed base without having to 
deal with a foreign government. For this reason, the U.S. 
is currently boosting infrastructure and operations in 
Guam. Current infrastructure to support logistics 
operations includes Anderson Air Force Base and several 
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deep-water berths for ships in Apra Harbor [Garcia, 2001]. 
In addition, Defense Logistics Agency opened Defense 
Distribution Depot Guam in October 2004.   
A potential disadvantage of locating kits in Guam may 
be its distance from potential disaster sites in comparison 
to other locations.  However, the advantage of operating 
from a U.S. territory may prevail.  
  
4. Diego Garcia 
 
Diego Garcia is a British territory that is mostly 
populated by the American military.  An agreement between 
the U.K. and the U.S. in 1966 allows for the mutual use of 
the island for the defense needs of both nations [MPSRON 2, 
2006].  The island is a key strategic location with a full 
range of facilities and is the last link in the logistics 
chain to support U.S. and British Naval Forces operating in 
the Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea [MPSRON 2, 2006].   
The air base at Diego Garcia can accommodate large 
aircraft but is limited in storage space and inventory 
management.  Cargo handling is also a limiting factor, as 
the base only has a small staff. For these reasons, Diego 
Garcia is considered a medium capacity storage location.   
 
5. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
 
The U.S. has been operating in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) since the end of World War II.  
While most of the infrastructure here is owned by the U.S. 
Army, in January 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding 
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between the D.P.R.K. and U.S. Forces Korea was signed to 
establish Defense Logistics Agency Defense Distribution 
Depot Korea (DDDK) at Camp Carroll.  DDDK is primarily used 
to enhance physical distribution services to U.S. Armed 
Forces serving on the Korean Peninsula [DLA DDC, 2006b].  
The primary APOD for Seoul is Osan, which is classified as 




Hawaii provides the second-closest U.S. owned area to 
Asia and the Pacific Islands and is the headquarters of 
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. The only restriction on 
the amount of inventory that can be held in Hawaii is 
transportation capacity.  Potential inventory managers for 
the PUKs include FISC Hawaii and DLA Defense Distribution 
Depot Pearl Harbor.  Hawaii offers a medium cargo handling 
facility at Hickam AFB to provide airlift for the PUKs. A 
disadvantage of storing PUKs in Hawaii is its distance from 
the rest of the region.    
 
7. Continental United States (CONUS) 
 
 Norfolk, Virginia and San Diego, California are home 
to the largest in-country naval bases.  Both locations have 
significant Navy presence and a great deal of logistics 
infrastructure.  
 Norfolk, VA is home to the world’s largest naval base 
[GlobalSecurity.org, 2006a].  Aside from the naval base, 
there is a significant amount of infrastructure in Norfolk 
62 
to store and transport relief material.  Defense Logistics 
Agency has a Defense Distribution Depot in Norfolk (DDNV).  
DDNV is already a major stock point for Humanitarian Daily 
Rations and is often called upon to provide humanitarian 
relief supplies in the U.S., Caribbean and other nations 
[DLA DDC, 2006c]. There is also a Fleet and Industrial 
Supply Center in Norfolk.   
 San Diego, CA is the homeport for over one-third of 
the Pacific Fleet.  Defense Logistics Agency also has a 
Defense Distribution Depot in San Diego (DDSD) though it 
specializes in serving the afloat units and aviation depot 
level repairables required by Naval Aviation Depot North 
Island.  Commander, Fleet Industrial and Supply Center is 
headquartered in San Diego.  In addition, FISC San Diego 
handles the requirements for units operating in the area. 
 Despite the number of possible storage locations 
directly in San Diego, it is possible that the PUKs will be 
stored at the San Joaquin Defense Distribution Depot in 
Northern California.  This storage location is preferable 
as it is closer to Travis AFB, the likely APOD for 
humanitarian assistance missions.  
There are disadvantages to storing the PUKs in the 
continental United States: In both Norfolk and San Diego, 
the PUKs will likely be stored at some distance from the 
transportation sites.  Additionally, both sites are far 








Australia is a strong ally and supporter of U.S. 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region.  Our nations have an 
excellent military-to-military relationship [Garcia, 2001]. 
However, there is a notable lack of U.S. military 
established infrastructure in Australia. This entails 
either renting space from the Australians or requesting to 
build temporary warehouses. Air Mobility Command flies 
regularly into Australia and uses the Richmond Royal Air 
Force facilities [Vanhoosen, 2006]. A potential 
disadvantage of storing kits in Australia is its extreme 
southern position in the region. 
   
E. LOCATION MODEL FORMULATION 
  
1. Indices [~Cardinality] 
s S∈  stockpile, candidate source [~10] 
c C∈  commodity, type of pack-up kit [~5] 
d D∈  demand, potential disaster location [~10] 
 
2. Provided Data [units] 
,c ddemand  c-kit demand of potential distaster d [PUK units] 
ccost   cost per c-kit [$/PUK unit] 
budget  maximum cost of PUKs to be pre-positioned [$] 
cspace   storage space per c-kit [space/PUK unit] 
, ssspace space minimum, maximum space in candidate stockpile s [space] 
,s ddist   distance from s to d [proximity] 
dist   large distance, , ,s ddist dist s d> ∀  [proximity] 
open   maximum stockpiles to select [cardinality] 
cckits ,kits  minimum, maximum number of c-kits to position [PUK units] 
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3. Decision Variables [units] 
 
,c sLOCATE  pre-positioned c-kits placed at source s [PUK units] 
, ,c s dDELIVER  c-kits from source s to satisfy demand d [PUK units] 
,c dSHORTAGE  unmet c-kit demand d [PUK units] 
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The objective (0) expresses the cost of delivering 
PUKs from pre-positioned stocks to each potential disaster 
in units of victim-proximity.  Shortages are penalized as 
if they are supplied by a far-distant source.  Constraint 
(1) limits the total, theater-wide investment in PUK units.  
Each constraint (2) limits deliveries to those units pre-
positioned at some stockpile.  Each constraint (3) requires 
that demand for a disaster be met by some delivery plan, or 
that a shortage be signaled.  Each constraint (4) either 
limits storage space of inventory at an open stockpile to 
the maximum capacity of that stockpile, or forces minimum 
space utilization of a stockpile, given that it is open.  
Constraint (5) limits the number of stockpiles that can be 
open.  Each constraint (6) stipulates a maximum number of 
PUKs to position, or a minimum.  Stipulations (7) define 





The location model has been implemented in the 
Generalized Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) and solved 
with the integer linear program package CPLEX [GAMS, 2006].  
Each disaster scenario is considered a separate instance 
from the other scenarios, not an aggregate need to outfit 
all disasters simultaneously.  
Distance between a PUK stockpile and a disaster 
scenario (dists,d) is measured using nautical-miles.  This 
distance could also be measured in flight hours, total 
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delivery time (including load and offload), or any other 
function that captures the logistic distance or delay from 
a storage location to a disaster site.  Changing this 
function will either centralize or disperse the favored 
storage location(s) depending on whether the function is 
superlinear or sublinear with respect to our baseline using 
nautical miles.  
Ten disaster scenarios are created, each of varying 
severity and type.  A summary of the disaster scenarios is 
shown in Table 5. 
Place: Disaster: 
Population  
Affected: LAT  LONG   Climate:
Wonosobo, 
Indonesia Earthquake 10,000  7° 21' S 109° 53' E Hot 
Baranguay, 




Flood 100,000 25° 37' N  88° 38' E Hot 
Latur region 




Storm 5,000 13° 43' N 100° 30' E Hot 
Indonesia:      
Guntur volcano 
Volcanic 
erupt 5,000  7° 08' S 107° 50' E Hot 
Fukuoka,        
Japan Earthquake 3,500 33° 35' N 130° 24' E Cold 
Gampaha, Sri 
Lanka Flooding 145,000  7° 06' N  80° 00' E Hot 
Nepal/India 
Border Earthquake 10,000 27° 29' N 82° 47' E Cold 
Artyom,         
Russia Earthquake 4,000 43° 23' N 132° 17' E Cold 
 
Table 5.   Disaster Scenarios Created for the Model 
 
 
The disaster scenarios are fictional, although they 
resemble similar disasters in the region based on the World 
Health Organization’s Emergency Disasters Database [World 
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Health Organization, 2006a].  The population affected 
represents the total number of people in need of 
humanitarian assistance. This number is not broken down by 
demographics. Once the location is determined, it is up to 
the planner to manually adjust the exact contents of the 
kit to accommodate the specific demographics of the 
disaster.  The number of kits needed is the affected 
population divided by 1,000. 
Candidate storage locations are identified by the 
Aerial Port of Debarkation from which the kits will be 
transported.  The APODs and their geographic location are 
listed in Table 6. 
 
APOD Locations: LAT  LONG  
Singapore (Paya Lebar)   1° 27' N 103° 49' E
Japan (Yokota AFB) 35° 17' N 139° 40' E
Guam (Andersen AFB) 13° 35' N 144° 55' E
Diego Garcia    7° 20' S   72° 25' E
Hawaii (Hickam AFB) 21° 21' N 157° 58' W
DPRK (Osan) 35° 08' N 128° 38' E
Sydney, Australia (Richmond RAFB) 33° 52' S 151° 12' E
Norfolk, VA 36° 50' N   76° 17' W
San Diego, CA (Travis AFB) 32° 42' N 117° 09' W
 
Table 6.   Aerial Ports of Debarkation for the 
Candidate Storage Locations 
 
 
There is a limit on the amount of material that 
realistically can be set aside.  Large inventories take up 
excessive space and the cost becomes prohibitive. In 
addition, these PUKs will require assets for 
transportation, manpower for distribution, and may have 
portions subject to spoilage (e.g., the medical kit and 
Humanitarian Daily Rations). The cost of kits created will 
need to stay within a specified dollar budget.  This budget 
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represents only the money to purchase the PUKs, and does 
not include transportation or storage costs.   
We demonstrate our model for the following instances, 
ranging from least to most restrictive: 
• Unlimited capacity and unlimited budget; 
• Unlimited budget with increasingly limited capacity; 
• Unlimited capacity with increasingly limited budget; 
and 
• Limited Budget and limited capacity – with and 




We start with an “infinite” budget ($500M) and an 
unlimited capacity to find the single, best location: we 
(i.e., our model) select Singapore.  Each disaster is 
covered, and 10 cold-weather and 145 hot-weather PUKs are 
procured.  These numbers represent the largest disaster of 
each climate category, and thus ensure no shortage for any 
disaster scenario regardless of climate.  The total cost of 
these kits is $135.8M. 
The logistics proximity objective can be further 
reduced by allowing additional locations.  While there is 
no formal restriction to choose the best k+1 storage 
locations that include the best k already found, we 
encounter this phenomenon.  The successive new locations 
are used to store PUKs closer to some scenarios, while 
leaving an adequate number of kits to cover the scenarios 
closer to the storage sites already chosen.  For example, 
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with two storage sites, Singapore retains 10 cold-weather 
PUKs but stores only 100 hot-weather PUKs.  Diego Garcia 
stores 145 hot PUKs – enough to supply the largest disaster 
closest to it. 
The best logistic proximity solution is achieved by 
using four storage locations.  Table 7 shows these 
locations, along with the decrease in nautical miles 
associated with each site addition, the total cost with the 
additional storage location and the number of each type of 
PUK procured.  With no budget limit or capacity 
restrictions, four locations cost $228.8M.  
 
Disaster: Singapore Diego Garcia Osan DPRK Guam 
Java Indonesia 607    
Baranguay Philippines 1377   1180 
Dinajpur Bangladesh 1696    
Latur India 1900 30   
Bangkok Thailand 762    
Guntur Indonesia 554    
Fukuoka Japan 2440  268  
Gampaha Sri Lanka 1465 145   
India Nepal Border 1977    
Artyom Russia 2942  449  
Victim K-Nautical-Miles: 15720 12530 7865 7668 
     
Cost (in millions): $135.8 $219.8 $225.4 $228.8 
Total Hot-weather PUKs 145 245 245 249 
Total Cold-weather PUKs 10 10 14 14 
 
Table 7.   Results from the Unlimited Budget, Unlimited 
Capacity Scenario   
 
The top row of the table lists, from left to right, the successive 
storage location selected as more storage sites are allowed.  The 
columns represent the change in thousand victim-nautical-miles by 
storing the total PUKs shown in the last two rows.  The greatest change 
in victim-nautical miles is achieved with the addition of the third 
location in Osan DPRK.  The fourth storage location in Guam presents 
only a marginal decrease in victim-nautical-miles saved.  More than 




Next, we allow an unlimited budget while uniformly 
decreasing the amount of per-location storage space 
available at each location.  The first change from the 
unlimited capacity scenario appears when storage space is 
reduced to 160 units per location.  This is the number of 
space units required to store enough hot and cold-weather 
PUKs to meet the total demand generated by the largest 
disaster in each category.   
Singapore remains the single best storage location. 
The amount of storage space does impact the number of kits 
and the types stored.  The first response as a consequence 
of reducing space is to decrease the number of cold weather 
PUKs to meet the second-largest cold-weather disaster.  
This is reasonable because there are fewer disasters 
requiring cold-weather PUKs and each cold-weather kit 
requires more storage space.   
 As the maximum per-site storage space available is 
decreased, the model attempts to use the same storage plan 
as unveiled in the unlimited scenario.  For example, when 
the maximum storage space available is limited to 150 
units, Singapore is selected as the single best storage 
location, with 4 cold-weather and 144 hot-weather PUKs.  
When two or more locations are chosen, the results are 
identical to those produced by the unlimited scenario for 
two or more locations, with 100 hot-weather PUKs and 10 
cold-weather PUKs in Singapore and 145 hot PUKs in Diego 
Garcia.  This trend continues until the maximum per-site 
storage capacity is limited to 100 units.  At this point, 
Osan is given all the cold-weather PUKs.  Continuing to 
reduce the amount of storage space forces the model to open 
more and more storage locations in an attempt to avoid 
shortage costs.  As before, the k+1 best choices include 
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• Diego Garcia, 
• Osan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), 
• Guam, 
• Yokota, Japan, 
• Sydney, Australia, 
• Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 
• Norfolk, Virginia, and 
• San Diego, California. 
 
We now assess the effect of budget changes on storage 
location choice.  For these model runs, storage capacity is 
unlimited and uniform among the storage locations.  Once 
again, Singapore is always selected as the best, single 
storage location for all budget values.   
The scenario begins by selecting the same four storage 
locations chosen by the unrestricted model. The number of 
storage locations that can be opened becomes increasingly 
restricted as the budget to purchase additional units is 
decreased.  Dropping a storage location is always preceded 
by a reduction in the number of cold-weather PUKs.  The 
cold-weather PUK is more expensive than the hot-weather 
one.  The order in which storage locations are opened does 
not change as budget decreases. 
In all three of these scenarios, Singapore is always 
the single, best location.  Osan is the location of choice 
for the cold-weather kits.  Finally, the order in which 
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storage locations are selected is the same throughout these 
scenarios. 
We now restrict the solution by both budget and 
storage space available.  We set an arbitrary budget of 
$50M.  Each storage location is given a maximum storage 
capacity based upon its logistics infrastructure.  The 







Selected Cold Hot 
Cost  
(Mil $)
First Yokota Japan 0 30 25.2
     
Second Yokota Japan 3 26  
 Diego Garcia 0 15 38.64
     
Third Yokota Japan 2 26  
 Diego Garcia 0 15  
 Osan, DPRK 0 15 49.84
     
Fourth Yokota Japan 2 21  
 Diego Garcia 0 15  
 Osan, DPRK 0 15  
 Singapore 0 5 49.84
 
Table 8.   Model Results Using a Budget of $50M and 
Maximum Capacities from Table 4. 
 
This table summarizes the decisions made when the model is given a 
budget of $50M and each storage location is restricted in size based on 
the evaluation shown in Table 4. For the first time, Singapore is not 
selected as the single best storage location.  This is because the 
location with the most storage space is selected to avoid shortage 
penalties.  By the fourth selection, the model has spent all the 
available budget and is now shifting PUKs around to further minimize 
victim-nautical-miles.  We have a fixed number of PUKs and are merely 
shuffling these closer to potential demands. 
 
 
The first location selected is Yokota, Japan.  This is 
the closest storage location with the most capacity. The 
budget limit is reached after opening a third storage 
location.  After this, the model can only shift the 
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location of units to achieve a lower minimum victim-
nautical miles.  The fourth storage location of choice is 
Singapore. 
 Guam has been a focal point of U.S. operations in the 
Pacific.  To examine Guam’s potential as a “single storage 
source” for PUKs, Guam is individually fixed open while the 
model is free to choose amongst all other locations after 
using Guam.  We then fix open Yokota, Japan, and then 
Singapore.  Forcing Guam to provide relief supplies does 
not inflict a large penalty in victim-nautical-miles 
transported in comparison to Yokota.  However, Guam and 
Yokota are both significantly worse than Singapore.  Every 
model run eventually opens Singapore. 
 
 Single Location Open: 
Disaster: Yokota Guam Singapore 
Java Indonesia 30.4 24.2 6.1 
Baranguay Philippines 6.9 4.7 5.5 
Dinajpur Bangladesh 39.9 48.6 25.4 
Latur India 51.8 59 28.5 
Bangkok Thailand 12.4 12.9 3.8 
Guntur Indonesia 15.6 12.6 2.8 
Fukuoka Japan    
Gampaha Sri Lanka 55 57.7 21.9 
India Nepal Border    
Artyom Russia    
Victim K-Nautical-Miles: 212 219.7 94 
 
Table 9.   Results of Respectively Forcing Yokota, Guam 
and Singapore Open with a Capacity of 15 Units  
 
The model is run three separate times forcing open Yokota, Guam, and 
Singapore, respectively.  Each of these storage locations is given a 
maximum storage capacity of 15 PUKs in order to compare similar total 
victim-nautical-mile results.  While Guam and Yokota do not differ by a 
large margin, there is a significant difference between the two and 




In restricted model runs, the cold-weather scenarios 
are often ignored to meet the needs of the hot-weather 
scenarios.  This is because the hot-weather kit costs less 
and requires less storage space.  Looking at the aggregate 
of the runs, Osan, D.P.R.K., is the storage location most 











IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
 
The Humanitarian Assistance pack-up kit (HA PUK) 
identifies items of critical importance for use after a 
disaster.  The kit contents also offer a standardized list 
of material to provide to those on scene to communicate 
exactly what they have available to them.  The PUK is meant 
to meet urgent requirements while additional data on the 
situation is being collected.  Each kit is designed to 
provide the basic items required by 1,000 people for 14 
days.  A hot and cold-weather version of the PUK is created 
to better meet the specific requirements of a given 
climate. 
Pre-positioning the kits in the region aims to hasten 
the delivery of aid to those who need it. Candidate 
locations have been identified and an optimization model 
used to determine the best location plan to facilitate 
movement in the region.  Running an unrestricted model, we 
find that Singapore is consistently selected as the single 
best storage location.  
An incremental, uniform reduction of the maximum 
storage capacity eventually results in opening all the 
storage locations in the following order: Singapore, Diego 
Garcia, Osan, Guam, Yokota, Sydney, Pearl Harbor, Norfolk 
and San Diego.  Reducing the budget has the opposite 
effect, and the number of storage locations opened is 
reduced until only Singapore remains open.  Additionally, 
as space and budget are reduced, hot-weather PUKs are 
preferred over cold-weather PUKs. 
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The addition of “real world” storage limitations and 
budget restrictions yields Yokota, Japan, as the single 
best storage location.  This is because Yokota is given a 
large storage capacity, and the model looks to avoid 
shortage penalties.  Guam is almost as good a location as 
Yokota and its use has benefits not accounted for in our 
model.  Each location, if individually considered, is about 
twice worse than Singapore.  Increasing the storage 
capacity at Singapore would substantially decrease the time 
it takes to transport the PUKs to the affected population. 
Singapore is the storage location of choice for hot-weather 
PUKs.  Osan, D.P.R.K., is the best location for cold-
weather PUKs.   
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
 
We assume that storage, obsolescence and 
transportation costs are not an issue, and that speed of 
response is the driving factor behind the items included in 
the PUK, and where their pre-positioning. These assumptions 
provide the flexibility to examine a range of potential 
relief material, as well as storage locations.  Further 
research should be done to determine if there are cost-
effective alternatives to the recommended items in this 
thesis.   
There is currently no operational plan for 
transportation and distribution of the PUK developed in 
this thesis.  We work under the assumption that a plan is 
in place and transportation time is the only measure of 
merit to move the kits from their storage locations to the 
general area of the disaster. The material in the kit is 
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only useful if it can be conveyed quickly to the people who 
need it.  The assets required to deliver the material will 
depend on the terrain, remaining infrastructure, and other 
factors too numerous to include in this thesis.  Potential 
delivery plans and a general concept of operation should be 
created to address the offload, personnel and 
transportation capabilities required to support a variety 
of disaster scenarios. 
Often our presence in an area is the most important 
benefit the United States Armed Forces can provide.  
Military transportation capability often proves to be 
invaluable to relief operations since many NGOs do not have 
the assets to get aid to those in need.  The prevailing 
philosophy of humanitarian operations should be to do the 
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Bangladesh Micronesia, Federated States of 
Bhutan Mongolia 
Burma (Myanmar) Nauru 
Cambodia Nepal 
China Niue 
Comoros New Zealand 
Brunei Palau, Republic of 
Cook Islands Papua New Guinea 
Fiji Philippines 
New Caledonia/French Polynesia (France) Russia 
India Samoa 
Indonesia Singapore 
Japan Solomon Islands 
Kiribati Sri Lanka 
Korea, Republic of Taiwan 
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APPENDIX B. BIRTHS PER 1,000 POPULATION AND 









Australia 12.14 173 24.28 
Bangladesh 29.8 57 59.6 
Bhutan 33.65 46 67.3 
Burma (Myanmar) 17.91 125 35.82 
Cambodia 26.9 69 53.8 
China 13.25 165 26.5 
Comoros 36.93 33 73.86 
Brunei 18.79 113 37.58 
Cook Islands 21 100 42 
Fiji 22.55 88 45.1 
New Caledonia/French Polynesia 
(France) 16.68 134 
 
33.36 
India 22.01 93 44.02 
Indonesia 20.34 107 40.68 
Japan 9.37 211 18.74 
Kiribati 30.65 53 61.3 
Korea, Republic of 10 203 20 
Korea, North 15.54 144 31.08 
Laos 35.49 38 70.98 
Madagascar 41.41 17 82.82 
Malaysia 22.86 85 45.72 
Maldives 34.81 41 69.62 
Marshall Islands, Republic of  33.05 47 66.10 
Mauritius 15.43 147 30.86 
Micronesia, Federated States of 24.68 78 49.36 
Mongolia 21.59 98 43.18 
Nauru 24.76 76 49.52 
Nepal 30.98 52 61.96 
Niue N/A N/A N/A 
New Zealand 13.76 161 27.52 
Palau, Republic of 18.03 121 36.06 
Papua New Guinea 29.36 59 58.72 
Philippines 24.89 74 49.78 
Russia 9.95 204 19.90 
Samoa 16.43 137 32.86 
Singapore 9.34 212 18.68 
Solomon Islands 30.01 55 60.02 
Sri Lanka 15.51 146 31.02 
Taiwan 12.56 172 25.12 
Thailand 13.87 160 27.74 
Tonga 25.37 73 50.74 
Tuvalu 22.18 91 44.36 
Vanuatu 22.72 87 45.44 
























APPENDIX C. CONTENTS OF THE PACK-UP KIT 





per Kit   
(short-
tons) 
Cost    
(in $ K) Planning Factor 




System 4610-01-488-6961 1 5.00 5.00  $  337.0  1 per 1000 people 
 
TWPS Ocean Intake 
Structure System 
Module 
specifications not available.  




specifications not available. 
(negligible weight added) negligible  1 per 1000 people 
 
60 KW 400HZ TQG 
Generator 6115-01-274-7395 2 2.10 4.20  $   57.0  2 per 1000 people 
 
Cubitainer - 5 
Gallon (36/BX) 7310-00-128-6837 28 0.01 0.28  $    3.0  1 per person 
        
 TOTALS:    9.48  $  397.0   
        
Sanitation - All Climates           
 
Latrine:  Grey 
Privacy Tent (EA) 4510-01-382-4315 50 0.004 0.20  $    4.2  1 per 20 people 
 
Latrine:  Commode, 
Field (EA) 4510-01-382-4289 50 0.015 0.75  $   14.6  
1 per 20 people 
(each commode 
includes daily 
restroom kit for 
20 people/3 days) 
 
Latrine:  Restroom 
kit, disp  
(100/BX) 4510-01-379-0190 150 0.020 3.00  $   63.0  
toilet paper, 
towelette and bags 
for 20 people/5 
days 
 
Latrine:  Can, 
waste receptacle, 
32 gallon with lid 
(EA) 7240-00-819-7735 60 0.015 0.90  $    2.1  
1 per latrine and 
1 per 100 people 
 
Trash bags 




16 quart bucket 
(laundry) unavail 100 0.001 0.10  $    1.0  1 per 10 people 
 
Laundry soap 
(PK/24) 7930-01-312-6389 42 0.015 0.63  $    1.4  1 per person 
        











per Kit  
(short-
tons) 
Cost   
(in $ K) Planning Factor 
Shelter - Common Items all Climates           
 
Blanket, Bed 66" x 
84"   (BX/12) 7210-00-054-7911 84 0.002 0.17  $    8.2  1 per person 
 Plastic Sheeting 
USAID PLASTIC 
SHEETING      
(RL - 24'x100') 10 0.064 0.64  negligible  
*includes 6 rolls 
of tape per box     
*plan factor: 
12'x20' per 10 
people (100 
people/roll) 
 Cot (EA) 7105-00-935-0422 1000 0.01 10.00  $   62.0  1 per person 
 Pillow (EA) 7210-01-376-5194 1000 0.001 1.00  $   10.0  1 per person 
 Pillow case (DZ) 7210-01-219-8618 84 0.005 0.42  $    3.2  1 per person 
 Sheet, Bed (DZ) 7210-01-220-1485 84 0.026 2.18  $   22.1  1 per person 
        
 TOTALS:    14.41  $  105.5   
        
Subsistence - All Climates           
 
Humanitarian Daily 
Ration  (BX/10) 8970-01-375-0516 14000 0.013 17.50  $   62.3  
1 per person per 
day 
        
 TOTALS:    17.50  $   62.3   
        
        




Kit - Basic Unit N/A 1 0.048 0.05  negligible  
1 per 1000 people   




Kit - Supplemental 
Unit N/A 1 0.502 0.50  $    5.0  
1 per 10,000 
people (~ 5K for 






(BX/288)  Priced EA 7210-00-935-6666 2 0.024 0.05  $    2.9  as required 
        













per Kit   
(short-
tons) 
Cost    
(in $ K) Planning Factor 
Mortuary - All Climates           
* 
Pouch, Human Remains 
(black) unavail. 500 0.004 2.00  $   18.0  
*Color choice 
depends on local 
custom 
* 
Pouch, Human Remains 
(white) (PG/20) 9930-01-357-5436 25 0.08 2.00  $   18.0  
500 provided in 
the Mortuary 
section.  If 
* 
Pouch, Human Remains 
(opaque) - EA 9330-01-331-6244 500 0.004 2.00  $   18.0  
more are required 




package  Fuji F470 
(Best Buy) Open Purchase 1 5E-04 0.00  $    0.2   
 
Photo printer, 
digital Canon Selphy 
Compact photo (Best 
Buy) Open Purchase 1 0.003 0.00  $    0.2  





memory cards SanDisk 
1GB (Best Buy) Open Purchase 1 5E-04 0.00  $    0.1  
DD Forms for 
mortuary affairs.  
Consult JP 4-06.   
 Gowns (12/PG) 6532-00-083-6535 25 0.009 0.23  $    0.2  300 per kit 
 Goggles (100/PG) 6540-01-290-1157 3 0.002 0.01  $    0.5  300 per kit 
 Gloves (100/PG) 6515-01-454-4784 3 0.002 0.01  $    0.1  300 per kit 
 
Masks, surgical 
(300/PG - 50/BX) 6532-00-247-9753 1 0.001 0.00  $    0.1  300 per kit 
        
 TOTALS:    6.24  $   55.4   
        
Hygiene Kit           1 kit per person 
 Toothbrush (144 BX) 8530-01-293-1388 7 0.003 0.02  $    0.3  1 per hygiene kit 
 Toothpaste (12 PG) 8520-01-303-4037 84 0.002 0.13  $    1.0  1 per hygiene kit 
 comb (144 BX) 8530-01-293-1384 7 0.004 0.03  $    0.4  1 per hygiene kit 
 
soap, toilet 5 oz 
(100 BX) 8520-00-531-6484 10 0.016 0.16  $    0.4  1 per hygiene kit 
 soap dish (12 PG) 8530-01-371-0055 84 0.001 0.04  $    0.6  1 per hygiene kit 
 
shampoo (15 oz 




28 pack always unavail 1000 0.001 0.52  $    7.8  1 per hygiene kit 
 razor (720 BX) 8530-01-347-9576 3 0.006 0.02  $    0.2  2 per hygiene kit 
 
deodorant, personal 
(12 CS) 3209HG 84 0.002 0.13  $    0.3  1 per hygiene kit 
 Towel (DZ) 7210-01-417-9681 84 0.001 0.04  $    8.4  1 per hygiene kit 
 Washcloth (DZ) 7210-00-718-8325 167 0.006 1.00  $    1.5  2 per hygiene kit 
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per Kit   
(short-
tons) 
Cost    
(in K) Planning Factor 
Infant Kit                     1 kit per infant (44 per PUK)  
 
Baby powder, 
cornstarch (12 BX) 8510-01-519-7739 3 0.006 0.02  $    0.1  1 per infant kit 
 Baby lotion (12 BX) 8510-00-347-2342 3 0.002 0.01  $    0.2  1 per infant kit 
 
Baby soap - 
Johnson's baby bar 
(3 oz bar) unavail 44 0.000 0.00  $    0.2  1 per infant kit 
 Baby shampoo (24 BX) 8520-01-149-4129 2 0.007 0.01  $    0.2  1 per infant kit 
 Washcloth (DZ) 7210-00-718-8325 15 0.006 0.09  $    0.1  4 per infant kit 
 
Cloth diapers 
(PG/300) 6532-01-127-2213 528 0.024 0.04  $    1.0  
12 per infant kit -  





Medium 12-24 lbs 6532-01-522-8052 44 0.005 0.22  $    1.1  
8/infant/day  (used 




(PG/144) 6530-01-525-4393 8 0.001 0.00  $    0.1  24 per infant kit 
 
Gerber vinyl pants 
(size 9/18 mths)    
(PK/3) unavail 132 0.000 0.03  $    1.2  3 per infant kit 
 
Gerber soft bite 
(baby spoon)(PG/6) unavail 8 0.002 0.02  $    0.1  
2 per infant kit      
(use for sup. feed) 
 Gerber bowls (PK/4) unavail 11 0.001 0.01  $    0.1  
2 per infant kit      
(use for sup. feed) 
 
Ivory Snow Laundry 
detergent powder, 15 
loads, 24 oz unavail 44 0.001 0.04  $    0.3  




(PG/12) 7210-01-204-2641 8 0.004 0.03  $    0.5  2 per infant kit 
 
Gown, infant 
(PG/500**) 6532-01-366-3201 88 0.000 0.01  $    0.1  
2 per infant kit      
**1 package is 
enough for apx 5 
1/2 kits (.22 
lbs/gown) 
 
Infant: cap, knit 
(100 Blue/100 Pink) 8450-01-314-2633 1 0.000 0.02  $    0.1  
2 per infant kit ~    
1 pink and 1 blue 
(200 = 10 lbs) 
        
 TOTALS:    0.55  $    5.4   
        











per Kit   
(short-
tons) 
Cost    
(in K) Planning Factor 
Cold Weather Specific             
 Tent, Arctic, 10-Man 8340-00-262-3684 250 0.038 9.50  $  484.0  1 per 4 people   
 Space Heater, Arctic 4520-01-444-2375 250 0.025 6.25  $  175.0  1 per Arctic tent   
 
TWPS Cold Weather 
Module 
specifications not available. 
(negligible weight added) negligible 1 per kit 
 
Blanket, Casualty 
(288/BX) priced EA 7210-00-935-6666 4 0.024 0.09  $    6.0  1 per person 
        
 TOTALS:    15.84  $  665.0   
        
Hot Weather Specific             
 
Tent, GP, Medium 
with Liner 8340-01-455-8947 84 0.273 22.89  $  110.0  1 per 12 people  
 Insect Net Protector 7210-00-266-9740 1000 0.001 0.50  $   29.0  1 per person 
 
Rain poncho, one-
size 8405-01-100-0976 1000 0.001 0.90  $   49.0  1 per person 
 
WHO IEHK (2006) 
Anti-malarial unit 
(accompanies the 
basic unit as 
required) N/A 1 0.018 0.02  $      -  
1 per 1000 people    
(10 come to a kit - 
cost is part of the 
overall IEHK price) 
 
Shoes, Shower (L) 
(72/PK) 6532-01-469-7520 14 0.003 0.04  $    1.0  1 set per person 
        
 TOTALS:     24.35  $  189.0   
        
        
 Hot-Weather Kit Total Weight and Price1   83  $    939    
 Cold-Weather Kit Total Weight and Price2   74  $  1,415    
        
1 While the cold weather kit weighs less, it has three times as many tents to store, as well as  
 bulkier items that require more storage space be made available  
2 One cold or hot-weather PUK will have the following transportation asset requirements (per  
 airframe) based solely on weight: 
        
    Number of sorties   




PUK Hot-PUK   
  C-5 70 2 2   
  C-130 10 8 9   
  C-17 32 3 3   
  B-747 90 1 1   
        
Note:  The items listed are representations of what should be included in these PUKs.  Alternate NSNs 
may be available.  Costs and weights are approximated and subject to change. 
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